Enigma in Law
https://enigma.or.id/index.php/law

e-ISSN 3026-6068
Vol. 4, No. 2 (2026) · pp. 96–114

ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE

Mathematical Gate or Substantive Justice? A Jurimetric Analysis of Margin-Threshold Waivers and 'Structured, Systematic, and Massive' Evidentiary Standards in Indonesia's 2025 Regional Election Disputes

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ARTICLE INFO

Received: October 15, 2026
Revised: November 10, 2026
Accepted: December 3, 2026
Available online: December 17, 2026
Published: December 30, 2026
Keywords Constitutional Court; Electoral dispute resolution; Empirical legal studies; Jurimetrics; Regional head elections
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ORCID 0009-0002-1705-0840
DOI
https://doi.org/10.61996/law.v4i2.156

ABSTRACT

Background. Article 158 of Law No. 10 of 2016 sets population-tiered vote-margin thresholds (0.5% to 2.0%) for challenging Indonesian regional head election (Pilkada) results before the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), yet jurisprudence after Decision No. 85/PUU-XX/2022 defers standing to safeguard substantive electoral justice.

Objective. To examine how the Court applied the Article 158 threshold in the 2025 disputes and which claims were associated with constitutional relief.

Methods. Eighty-two non-overlapping 2025 Pilkada judgments across seventy-four contests and twenty-eight provinces were analyzed: forty-eight full-text judgments (10,198 pages) from the JDIH Bawaslu repository (Stratum I) and the complete forty-case national evidentiary-trial census (Stratum II). The analysis combined fractional logit, Firth penalized logistic regression, King–Zeng prior correction, statutory hermeneutics, and comparative electoral analysis.

Results. Across Stratum I multi-candidate petitions, vote margins exceeded statutory caps by a median Threshold Overrun Ratio (TOR) of 10.40x. A petition exceeding the cap by 230 votes (TOR = 1.14x) was barred when uncorroborated, whereas a margin of 49.05x was waived once statutory candidate ineligibility was proven. Across all forty evidentiary trials, twenty-six petitions (65.0%) won relief: eleven candidate disqualifications, thirteen non-disqualification revotes, one recount, and one decree rectification. Upstream Bawaslu corroboration (OR = 519.68, $p < 0.001$) and Article 7(2) eligibility defects (OR = 14.32, $p < 0.001$) were strongly associated with relief, whereas uncorroborated vote-buying claims failed (0/24; OR = 0.04).

Conclusion. In this corpus, threshold enforcement followed corroborated eligibility and supervisory defects more than margin proximity, which supports the reforms discussed in light of Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Constitutional and statutory background

Constitutional democracies that give final electoral dispute resolution to apex constitutional tribunals face a lasting institutional dilemma. Hundreds of post-election challenges must be filtered within compressed statutory deadlines, yet adjudication should not shrink into a mechanical "calculator court" (*mahkamah kalkulator*) that ratifies tainted mandates[1,2]. In Indonesia, Article 1(2) and Article 1(3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (*Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945*, hereinafter UUD NRI 1945) ground popular sovereignty in a constitutional rule-of-law state (*negara hukum*). Article 18(4) requires governors (*gubernur*), regents (*bupati*), and mayors (*walikota*) to be "democratically elected" (*dipilih secara demokratis*), and Article 22E(1) guarantees elections that are

direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair (*langsung, umum, bebas, rahasia, jujur, dan adil*, *luber dan jurdil*)[3–5]. A landmark jurisdictional settlement came in Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*, MK) Decision No. 85/PUU-XX/2022[6]. It abolished the transitional plan for a specialized electoral judicial body under Article 157(1)–(2) of Law No. 10 of 2016[7] and permanently vested the adjudication of regional election results (*Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah*, PHPU Kada) in the Constitutional Court. Indonesia then held its first nationwide simultaneous regional head elections (*Pilkada Serentak Nasional*) on 27 November 2024, across 37 provinces and 508 regencies and municipalities[8–10]. Petitions came quickly. Within weeks of vote recapitulation, 310 petitions (23 gubernatorial, 238 regency, and 49 mayoral) reached the Constitutional Court. The statutory calendar for them was capped at forty-five working days by Article 157(8) of Law No. 10 of 2016.

The most contested procedural gatekeeping rule in Indonesian public law sits at the center of this docket surge: Article 158(1)–(2) of Law No. 10 of 2016 (the Second Amendment to Law No. 1 of 2015 on Regional Head Elections). The legislature enacted it with a clear aim: to stop losing candidates with wide electoral deficits from paralyzing local executive transitions. Article 158 conditions a petitioner's legal standing (*kedudukan hukum* / legal standing) on a population-tiered ceiling for the vote margin. The ceiling is 2.0% of total valid votes in provinces up to 2 million inhabitants or regencies/cities up to 250,000 inhabitants, and it steps down to 1.5%, 1.0%, and 0.5% in jurisdictions exceeding 12 million (provincial) or 1 million (regency/municipal) inhabitants[8,11]. The text is blunt. Read literally, Article 158 bars any candidate pair whose deficit exceeds the applicable cap from having the merits of alleged electoral fraud examined at all. In practice, the Court has departed from that sequence. From 2020 through the 2024–2025 procedural recodification in Constitutional Court Regulation (*Peraturan Mahkamah Konstitusi*, PMK) No. 3 of 2024[12], it has not treated Article 158 as a preliminary arithmetic guillotine. The nine-justice plenary bench routinely defers its standing ruling to the substantive considerations (*Pertimbangan Hukum*) whenever a petition alleges "specific conditions or occurrences" (*kondisi atau kejadian khusus*). Examples include statutory candidate ineligibility under Article 7(2), apparatus mobilization under Article 71, "structured, systematic, and massive" (*terstruktur, sistematis, dan masif*, TSM) money politics under Articles 73 and 135A, unredressed supervisory recommendations, and ballot-design anomalies in uncontested single-candidate (*calon tunggal*) races[9–11]. Table 1 maps the primary constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and comparative legal instruments that govern this institutional tension.

Table 1. Primary Indonesian, constitutional, and comparative legal instruments analyzed.

Instrument	Year	Jurisdiction	Key provisions & tempus regit actum scope	Status
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945)	1945/2002	Indonesia	Art. 1(2) popular sovereignty; Art. 1(3) *negara hukum*; Art. 18(4) democratic election of regional heads; Art. 22E(1) luber & jurdil elections; Art. 24C(1) MK electoral jurisdiction; Art. 28D(1) just legal certainty	In force
Constitutional Court Law (Law No. 24/2003 as last amended by Law No. 7/2020)	2003/2020	Indonesia	Art. 10(1)(d) final & binding election-results adjudication; Art. 45(1) conviction based on constitutional evidence; Art. 55 suspension of parallel administrative proceedings	In force
Regional Election Law (Law No. 1/2015 as amended by Law No. 8/2015, Law No. 10/2016, & Law No. 6/2020)	2015/2020	Indonesia	Art. 7(2)(g) ex-convict cooling-off & disclosure; Art. 7(2)(n) two-term incumbency bar; Art. 54C single-candidate plebiscite; Art. 71(1)–(3) official neutrality & 6-month mutation ban; Arts. 73 & 135A TSM vote buying; Art. 157(5)&(8) 3-day filing & 45-day resolution limits; Art. 158(1)–(2) 0.5%–2.0% margin-threshold gate	In force (governed all 2025 PHPU Kada dockets)
Landmark MK Constitutional Review Precedents (100/PUU-XIII/2015; 85/PUU-XX/2022; 2/PUU-XXI/2023; 129/PUU-XXII/2024)	2015/2024	Indonesia	100/2015: single-candidate elections allowed with an agree/disagree choice (blank column, *kolom kosong*, now in Art. 54C of Law No. 10/2016); 85/2022: permanent MK PHPU Kada jurisdiction; 2/2023 & 129/2024: two-term incumbency counted from actual service, including acting service (*menjalankan tugas*)	Binding erga omnes constitutional mandates
Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025	2025	Indonesia	Reinterprets Arts. 139–140 of the Pilkada Law to transform Bawaslu provincial/regency administrative violation outputs from non-binding recommendations (*rekomendasi*) into final and binding adjudicative decisions (*putusan*)	Binding erga omnes constitutional mandate
Constitutional Court Regulation (PMK) No. 3 of 2024 on Regional Election Result Dispute Procedure	2024	Indonesia	Art. 7(2) filing window (3 working days); Art. 4(1)(d) accredited observers as petitioners where only one pair contests; Arts. 6 and 37 two-stage triage: Stage-1 dismissal decree/judgment (*Putusan* Dismissal) vs Stage-2 plenary evidentiary trial (*Pemeriksaan Persidangan Lanjutan*); Art. 48 witness and expert numbers fixed by the Court (in practice up to six combined in gubernatorial and four in regency/city disputes)	In force
Electoral Administrative Instruments (PKPU No. 8/2024 jo. PKPU No. 10/2024; PKPU No. 15/2024; K*eputusan* KPU No. 1774/2024)	2024	Indonesia	Candidate nomination verification, recapitulation procedures, and single-candidate/disqualified-rival ballot counting guidelines contested across the 2025 cycle	Partially invalidated / superseded in application
Law No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright (UU Hak Cipta)	2014	Indonesia	Art. 42(d) exempting judicial decisions and court determinations (*putusan pengadilan atau penetapan hakim*) from copyright restriction	In force
Constitution of Kenya (2010) & Elections Act, No. 24 of 2011	2010/2017	Kenya	Art. 81(e) electoral principles; Art. 140 presidential petitions; Elections Act s. 83 disjunctive quantitative or qualitative non-compliance annulment standard (Raila Odinga v IEBC [2017])	Actively applied
Political Constitution of Mexico (Art. 41 Base VI) & General Law on Electoral Disputes (LGSMIME)	1996/2014	Mexico	Quantitative & qualitative outcome-determinacy (*determinancia*) doctrine of the TEPJF; Art. 41 Base VI rebuttable systemic nullity presumption when margin < 5.0%	Actively applied

Instrument	Year	Jurisdiction	Key provisions & tempus regit actum scope	Status
2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) & COMELEC Automated Election Protest Rules (Res. No. 8804 as amended)	2010/2022	Philippines	Rule 65 PET pilot-province rule: the protestant designates not more than three pilot provinces, and the protest may be dismissed without considering the rest if the case will most probably fail	Actively applied
Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, Art. 41), Federal Electoral Scrutiny Act (*Wahlprüfungs*gesetz), & BVerfG Judgment 2 BvC 4/23	1949/2023	Germany	Seat- and mandate-relevance (*Mandatsrelevanz*) doctrine paired with surgical precinct-level partial repeat voting (*teilweise Wahlwiederholung* in 455 of 2,256 Berlin districts, 19 Dec 2023)	Actively applied

Note. Domestic statutes, constitutional review judgments, procedural regulations, and foreign legal instruments are cited directly by official title and provision in the prose and consolidated in Table 1; the numbered Vancouver reference list (1–40) is reserved for scholarly articles carrying verified Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs).

1.2 Theoretical framework

Economic theories of litigation selection and comparative electoral jurisprudence help explain a pattern in patronage-intensive democracies: post-election litigation is filed very unevenly, but judicial intervention is highly selective. Under Priest and Klein's divergent-expectations framework, litigation with symmetric stakes and transparent legal standards clusters near marginal cases, where plaintiff win rates approach 50%[13]. Winner-take-all executive elections are different. Defeated candidates face asymmetric political and financial payoffs there. A constitutional challenge preserves coalition bargaining leverage and appeases campaign financiers. It also gives a low-cost chance of an annulment or revote (*Pemungutan Suara Ulang*, PSU), even when the vote deficit exceeds the statutory ceiling tenfold or fortyfold[14,15]. Empirical scholarship on Indonesian electoral politics also documents widespread clientelism, vote buying (*politik uang* / *serangan fajar*), and bureaucratic mobilization (*ketidaknetralan aparatur sipil negara* [ASN] and village heads [*kepala desa*]) in local contests[16,17], including violations of neutrality by village officials[18]. The result is a difficult evidentiary trilemma for the Court. If the Court enforces Article 158 mechanically, incumbents who engineered disqualifying nomination fraud or ignored supervisory orders go unpunished whenever they win by more than 2%. If it waives Article 158 on uncorroborated allegations of retail vote buying, under compressed 45-day proceedings with a limited number of witnesses (the Court fixes the number under Art. 48 of PMK No. 3 of 2024[12]; in practice at most four witnesses and experts combined in regency and city disputes and six in provincial disputes), every decisive electoral victory risks destabilization.

Recent scholarship in Enigma in Law has shown that empirical legal studies and jurimetrics can expose systematic gaps between statutory text and institutional practice in Indonesian adjudication, governance, and regulatory compliance. Topics include custodial sentencing variance under Supreme Court guidelines[19], prohibited standard clauses that survive in digital consumer contracts[20], and procedural agenda-setting veto points in legislative drafting[21]. Indonesian constitutional and election-law scholarship has produced important doctrinal analyses. These debate the Constitutional Court's oscillation between procedural formalism and substantive justice[8–11], offer qualitative interpretations of TSM fraud[22,23], address unimplemented recommendations of the General Election Supervisory Body (*Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum*, Bawaslu)[24], and examine the normative politics of the 2025 revote wave[25,26]. Four gaps remain open.

1.3 Research gaps, aims, and hypotheses

1. Absence of Continuous Quantitative Gatekeeping Measurement: Prior Pilkada studies treat Article 158 as a pure dichotomy ("enforced" versus "waived"). To our knowledge, none constructs a continuous Threshold Overrun Ratio (TOR), defined as the ratio of the actual vote margin to the maximum vote margin permitted under Article 158, so the arithmetic width of enforced versus waived electoral deficits has not been measured.

2. Outcome-Circular Doctrinal Selection: Existing studies examine small, hand-picked samples of landmark disqualifications (3–10 cases). They do not pair a full-text multi-province screening baseline with the complete national census of Stage-2 evidentiary trials. Researchers therefore cannot estimate multivariate odds ratios or separate true substantive drivers from survivor bias.

3. Unmeasured Institutional Weight of Upstream Bawaslu Supervision versus Statutory Eligibility: To our knowledge, no jurimetric model has tested econometrically why candidate-eligibility defects under Article 7(2) and upstream Bawaslu supervisory corroboration overcome large electoral margins, while standalone petitioner-alleged vote buying (TSM *politik uang*) systematically fails.

4. Disconnect from Post-2025 Structural Reform: To our knowledge, no empirical study has yet linked the round-one (February 2025) and round-two post-PSU (May 2025) Pilkada litigation arcs to Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025. The sagas of Banjarbaru, Tasikmalaya, and Gorontalo Utara are examples. That decision, issued on 30 July 2025 and applicable prospectively, turned Bawaslu's administrative violation outputs from non-binding recommendations (*rekomendasi*) into binding decisions (*putusan*)[27].

This study addresses these four gaps using eighty-two (N = 82) non-overlapping substantive 2025 Constitutional Court Pilkada judgments. They span seventy-four (74) distinct regional contests in twenty-eight (28) provinces. We test four pre-specified empirical-doctrinal hypotheses:

- **H1 (The Gatekeeping Bifurcation):** Contested petitions typically carry margins far above the Article 158 cap, yet enforcement is expected to be non-monotonic in TOR. Petitions that overrun the cap by small margins (1.0x < TOR < 2.0x) are barred absent institutional corroboration. Petitions with large deficits (TOR > 8x to 49x) receive explicit Article 158 waivers when statutory candidate-eligibility or supervisory-corroborated defects are established.

- **H2 (Dual Pathways to Constitutional Relief and Remedy Stratification):** After controlling for stratum selection and threshold compliance, substantive relief follows two separate pathways. Pathway I involves Article 7(2) statutory candidate-eligibility defects, which drive candidate disqualification and region-wide revotes even when administrative bodies cleared the nomination. Pathway II involves upstream Bawaslu supervisory corroboration of unredressed polling-station or administrative breaches, which drives targeted revotes.

- **H3 (Collapse of Uncorroborated Retail Vote-Buying Claims):** TSM vote-buying allegations appear in over half of all petitions. Standalone claims that lack Bawaslu supervisory corroboration or an accompanying Article 7(2) eligibility defect nonetheless show a near-zero probability of constitutional relief (OR < 0.15).

• **H4 (Deliberative Reasoning Expansion Under Inverted Standing Review):** Even in Stage-1 preliminary dismissals, the Court devotes roughly one-tenth of the full judgment text (~20–70 pages) to *Pertimbangan Hukum* that evaluate "specific occurrences" before enforcing Article 158. Substantive Bawaslu-corroborated and Stage-2 revote judgments give this deliberative reasoning almost twice that share (Kruskal–Wallis $p < 0.05$).

2. Methods

2.1 Integrated two-stratum jurimetric, doctrinal, and comparative design

This study uses a mixed empirical–doctrinal legal methodology with three components: (i) computational archival jurimetrics[19,28], (ii) four-canon statutory and constitutional hermeneutics (grammatical, systematic, teleological, and historical interpretation), and (iii) functional-equivalence comparative electoral law[29]. The comparison covers four purposively selected jurisdictions: Kenya, Mexico, the Philippines, and Germany. Indonesia's 2024–2025 simultaneous Pilkada cycle produced a national universe of 310 registered petitions[30]. Of these, 273 were substantive adjudicative *Putusan* and 37 were non-adjudicative procedural *Ketetapan* recording 29 withdrawals and 8 lapses. The universe is heavily skewed toward Stage-1 preliminary dismissals: 227 inadmissible *Tidak Dapat Diterima* plus 6 non-jurisdictional rulings make 233 Stage-1 *Putusan*, against 40 Stage-2 plenary evidentiary-trial *Putusan*. Of the latter, 26 granted relief. That is a 9.52% relief base rate across 273 *Putusan*, or 8.39% across 310 registrations.

Choice-based econometric sampling[31] shows the difficulty. A small random draw from a universe in which over 90% of petitions are dismissed captures too few positive events (2–4 revotes) to identify multivariate remedy determinants without severe small-sample separation. Analysing Stage-2 trials alone would instead induce classic truncation on the preliminary gate. We address both threats with a Two-Stratum Hybrid Design (N = 82 non-overlapping substantive 2025 *Putusan*):

1. Stratum I (n_1 = 48 Full-Text Verbatim JDIH Bawaslu Corpus; 10,198 PDF pages; 2,521,496 words): The stratum covers all 48 substantive 2025 Constitutional Court Pilkada *Putusan* archived as full verbatim PDFs in the open-access Legal Documentation and Information Network (*Jaringan Dokumentasi dan Informasi Hukum*, JDIH) of Bawaslu RI (https://jdih.bawaslu.go.id). It comprises 44 Round-I judgments (38 Stage-1 dismissals + 6 Stage-2 plenary judgments) and 4 Round-II post-PSU judgments (26 May 2025). With this material, continuous TOR, word and page length, and *Pertimbangan Hukum* share can be calculated directly.

2. Stratum II (N_2 = 40 Complete National Stage-2 Evidentiary-Trial Census, 24 February 2025): The stratum includes all 40 disputes nationwide that passed Stage-1 preliminary screening and went on to plenary evidentiary trials (*Pemeriksaan Persidangan Lanjutan*, 7–17 February 2025). It unites the 6 cross-stratum anchor dockets (30/Magetan, 55/Gorontalo Utara, 96/Lamandau, 100/Belu, 132/Tasikmalaya, and 183/Pamekasan) with the 34 remaining non-overlapping Stage-2 dockets (MK49–MK82).

Stratum I reflects open-access supervisory repository coverage across 16 provinces. Stratum II is the complete 100% population census of all 40 Stage-2 trials across 27 provinces. All frequentist quantities (p-values, penalized odds ratios, and cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals) are therefore read as descriptive summaries. For the 40 Stage-2 trials, which form a census, they describe the strength of association within that set of cases. For the pooled two-stratum design they serve only as heuristic measures of evidential weight, not as estimates for a defined sampling frame.

2.2 Data acquisition, screening, and copyright compliance

Research ethics and network governance guided how the data were acquired. Automated queries to www.mkri.id met an anti-bot perimeter challenge (HTTP 403). No circumvention or scraping workaround was attempted. Instead, all full-text judicial PDFs were collected only through standard, ungated public HTTP requests to Indonesia's official government election-supervision legal repository, JDIH Bawaslu RI (scripts/01_harvest_and_parse_corpus.py). Article 42(d) of Law No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright[32] expressly excludes official court decisions and judicial determinations (*putusan pengadilan atau penetapan hakim*) from copyright protection. On that basis, verbatim text was extracted with a native macOS PDFKit binary (scripts/pdf_to_text.swift) and stripped of repository watermarks (scripts/01b_clean_and_verify_corpus.py). Each file was then fingerprinted cryptographically through SHA-256 checksums (data/corpus_sha256_manifest.json).

Deterministic screening adapted from PRISMA-ScR (data/screening_exclusion_log.csv, Table 2) audited all 58 harvested 2025 judicial records. Of these, 3 non-PHPU Kada secondary/legislative files were excluded under criterion E1. An identical duplicate (1 file) upload of Belu Regency (100/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025) was removed under E2. A further 6 summary procedural *Ketetapan* were excluded under E3: they recorded voluntary petition withdrawals (penarikan kembali) or lapses (gugur) without any adjudication of standing or merits (62/Bengkulu, 111/Cirebon, 116/Malang, 140/Pemalang, 143/Banyuasin, and 167/Kotawaringin Barat). This left n_1 = 48 substantive full-text Stratum I *Putusan*. Adding the 34 non-overlapping Stage-2 evidentiary-trial dockets (MK49–MK82) gives a master corpus of N = 82 non-overlapping 2025 Constitutional Court *Putusan* across 74 unique regional contests (contest_cluster_id) and 28 provinces.

Table 2. PRISMA corpus screening flow, two-stratum sampling architecture, electoral tier, and archipelagic distribution (N = 82).

Corpus dimension / Geographic & procedural breakdown	National 2025 Universe	Stratum I Full-Text (n_1)	Stratum II Stage-2 Census (N_2)	Master Non-Overlapping (N)	Share of Master N (%)
Panel A: PRISMA screening & two-stratum synthesis	—	—	—	—	—
Total 2025 records registered (MK) / harvested (JDIH Bawaslu)	310	58	40	—	—
Excluded E1: Non-PHPU Kada legislative / secondary records	0	3	0	—	—
Excluded E2: Exact duplicate repository upload (100/Belu)	0	1	0	—	—
Excluded E3: Procedural *Ketetapan* (withdrawals 29 / lapses 8 nationally; 6 in JDIH)	37	6	0	—	—

Corpus dimension / Geographic & procedural breakdown	National 2025 Universe	Stratum I Full-Text (n_1)	Stratum II Stage-2 Census (N_2)	Master Non-Overlapping (N)	Share of Master N (%)
Substantive *Putusan* (with 6 cross-stratum anchor dockets de-duplicated)	273	48	40	82	100.00%
Panel B: Procedural adjudication stage & cycle round	—	—	—	—	—
Round-I Stage-1 Preliminary Screening Dismissals (4–5 Feb 2025)	233	38	0	38	46.34%
Round-I Stage-2 Plenary Evidentiary Trials (24 Feb 2025)	40	6	40	40	48.78%
Round-II Post-PSU Screening Dismissals (26 May 2025: 318, 320, 321, 324)	—	4	0	4	4.88%
Panel C: Electoral tier (74 unique contests across 28 provinces)	—	—	—	—	—
Gubernatorial (Pemilihan Gubernur, PHPU.GUB)	23	3	3	6	7.32%
Regency (Pemilihan Bupati, PHPU.BUP)	238	39	34	67	81.71%
Mayoral (Pemilihan Walikota, PHPU.WAKO)	49	6	3	9	10.98%
Panel D: Archipelagic distribution across Indonesia (28 provinces)	—	—	—	—	—
Java & Banten (6 provinces)	—	16	4	17	20.73%
Sumatra (8 provinces)	—	9	12	21	25.61%
Sulawesi (5 provinces)	—	11	7	16	19.51%
Kalimantan (4 provinces)	—	7	6	13	15.85%
Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku & Papua (5+ provinces)	—	5	11	15	18.29%

Note. The 48 Stratum I full-text PDFs span 10,198 pages (mean = 212.46 pages; median = 186.5 pages; range 56–725 pages) and 2,521,496 words. Six Stage-2 judgments (30/Magetan, 55/Gorontalo Utara, 96/Lamandau, 100/Belu, 132/Tasikmalaya, and 183/Pamekasan) appear in both Stratum I and Stratum II and enter the pooled N = 82 dataset exactly once.

2.3 Non-circular upstream feature coding and human reliability audit

Naive legal text analytics often suffers from outcome-concomitant circularity. Predictor keywords drawn from the Court's own legal reasoning (*Pertimbangan Hukum*) leak judicial conclusions into right-hand-side covariates. To remove this circularity, scripts/02_code_and_analyze.py locates the structural section header 3. PERTIMBANGAN HUKUM in every Stratum I transcript. It truncates Sections 3 (*Pertimbangan Hukum*), 4 (*Konklusi*), and 5 (*Amar Putusan*) before feature extraction. All four substantive claim indicators (C1–C4) are coded only from the Petitioner's upstream pleading (*Duduk Perkara* [2.1]). The indicator bawaslu_corroboration is coded only from Bawaslu's upstream written supervisory report. Transcript section [2.6] often lists Related Party exhibits (Bukti PT) in lengthy Stage-2 trials. The parser therefore anchors extraction on the structural supervisory header "Menimbang bahwa terhadap permohonan Pemohon, *Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum*..." (typically located at paragraphs [2.7] or [2.8], Table 3). This anchor separates formal, unexecuted supervisory violation recommendations from administrative clearances.

Table 3. Operational jurimetric coding scheme, statutory anchors, and non-circular upstream measurement rules (N = 82).

Variable code	Legal / methodological construct	Statutory / doctrinal anchor	Operational measurement rule
tor & log10_tor	Continuous Threshold Overrun Ratio (Stratum I, $n_1 = 44$ multi-candidate)	Art. 158(1)–(2) Law 10/2016	$TOR_i = \Delta V_i / (\theta_i \cdot V_{valid,i})$, where ΔV_i is absolute winner–petitioner vote difference and $\theta_i \in \{0.005, 0.010, 0.015, 0.020\}$ is population-tiered margin cap (TOR ≤ 1.0 satisfies Art. 158 arithmetically)
within_158_gate	Track-A arithmetic compliance (N = 82)	Art. 158(1)–(2) Law 10/2016; PMK 3/2024	1 if candidate-vs-candidate margin satisfies $TOR_i \leq 1.000$ (n = 24); 0 if over-threshold or single-candidate plebiscite dispute (n = 58)
judicial_reasoning_share	Deliberative reasoning allocation (Stratum I, $n_1 = 48$)	Art. 45(1) MK Law; PMK 3/2024	Character share of Section 3 (*Pertimbangan Hukum*) through pronouncement relative to total judgment length (mean = 10.91%, range 3.05%–25.07%)
c1_candidate_eligibility	Statutory candidate-eligibility defect (C1)	Art. 7(2)(g), (i), (n) Law 10/2016; MK 2/2023 & 129/2024	1 if upstream posita challenges candidate nomination validity: two-term incumbency (2 periode), ex-convict cooling-off/honest disclosure (mantan terpidana), or diploma/identity authenticity (n = 25); 0 otherwise (n = 57)
c2_apparatus_neutrality	State/regional apparatus or incumbent program abuse (C2)	Art. 71(1)–(3) Law 10/2016	1 if upstream posita alleges ASN, acting regional head (Penjabat), subdistrict head (camat), or village-head (*kepala desa*) mobilization, 6-month official mutations, or social-aid (bansos/PKH) deployment (n = 60); 0 otherwise (n = 22)

Variable code	Legal / methodological construct	Statutory / doctrinal anchor	Operational measurement rule
c3_tsm_vote_buying	TSM vote buying / transactional patronage (C3)	Arts. 73(1)–(4) & 135A Law 10/2016	1 if upstream posita alleges structured/widespread cash, staple-goods (sembako), *serangan fajar*, or paid political-contract patronage (n = 40); 0 otherwise (n = 42)
c4_tabulation_procedural	Polling-station administration, ballot design, or count error (C4)	Arts. 54C, 112 Law 10/2016; PKPU 15/2024	1 if upstream posita alleges Sirekap/Form C-D alteration, deceased/ineligible voter roll abuse, flood force majeure, *noken* diversion, or single-ticket blank-column negation (n = 48); 0 otherwise (n = 34)
bawaslu_corroboration	Upstream Bawaslu supervisory corroboration	Arts. 134, 139–140 Law 10/2016; MK 104/2025	1 if Bawaslu's upstream supervisory record documented an unexecuted PSU/administrative violation recommendation or disqualifying criminal conviction (n = 22); 0 if Bawaslu reported "tidak terdapat laporan/temuan" or cleared nomination (n = 60)
pre158_formal_defect	Pre-Art. 158 formal admissibility defect	Art. 157(4)–(5) Law 10/2016; PMK 3/2024	1 if dismissed prior to Art. 158 analysis for untimeliness (melewati tenggang waktu), *obscuur libel* (kabur sustained), or unaccredited civic-observer standing (n = 15); 0 otherwise (n = 67)
relief_granted & disqualification_ordered	Substantive constitutional relief & candidate disqualification	Art. 24C(1) UUD 1945; Art. 10(1)(d) MK Law	relief_granted = 1 if MK ordered PSU, candidate disqualification, vote recount, or decree rectification (n = 26); disqualification_ordered = 1 if MK disqualified a candidate/ticket and ordered full PSU (n = 11)

We validated our non-circular upstream lexical coder against domain-expert legal reading through a case-by-case Algorithmic–Human Construct Reliability Audit. It covered n = 24 judgments (50.0% of Stratum I), spanning all 6 Stage-2 anchor dockets and 18 stratified Stage-1 dockets across gubernatorial, regency, and mayoral tiers. Verbatim case rationales are archived in data/manual_reliability_audit_24_cases.csv[33–35]. Classic Cohen's κ is attenuated downward when binary base rates depart from 0.50, the well-known Feinstein–Cicchetti prevalence paradox[34]. We therefore report raw percentage agreement next to both κ and Byrt, Bishop, and Carlin's Prevalence-Adjusted Bias-Adjusted Kappa (PABAK)[35]. Table 4 shows the results. Dispositive four-category gate outcomes and C3 vote-buying claims reached 100.00% raw agreement (κ = 1.000, PABAK = 1.000). Upstream Bawaslu corroboration reached 95.83% agreement (κ = 0.647, PABAK = 0.917). C2 apparatus mobilization reached 91.67% agreement (κ = 0.780, PABAK = 0.833). C4 polling/tabulation claims reached 87.50% agreement (κ = 0.750, PABAK = 0.750), and C1 candidate eligibility reached 83.33% agreement (κ = 0.600, PABAK = 0.667). The audit also caught and corrected a serious Indonesian legal NLP pitfall during parser development. In Section 4 (*Konklusi*), the Court routinely writes "Eksepsi Termohon mengenai permohonan Pemohon tidak jelas (kabur) adalah tidak beralasan menurut hukum" when it rejects a respondent's *obscuur libel* exception. Clause-level parsing is needed to tell rejected exceptions apart from sustained *obscuur libel* dismissals. Without it, narrow-margin Article 158 dismissals, such as Kolaka Utara 153/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 [TOR = 1.139x], would be misclassified as procedural *obscuur libel* rulings.

Table 4. Authentic case-by-case algorithmic–human construct reliability audit

Coded construct	Audited (n)	Disagreements	Raw agreement (%)	Cohen's κ	PABAK	Substantive source of human–regex boundary cases
Four-class gate & merits outcome (gate_category)	24	0	100.00%	1.000	1.000	Exact 100% match after distinguishing rejected vs sustained *obscuur libel* clauses in [4.4]–[4.6]
TSM vote-buying allegation (c3_tsm_vote_buying)	24	0	100.00%	1.000	1.000	Explicit lexical markers (*politik uang*, money politic, *serangan fajar*, pembagian uang) in posita
Upstream Bawaslu corroboration (bawaslu_corroboration)	24	1	95.83%	0.647	0.917	Low base rate (2/24 positive) induces Feinstein–Cicchetti κ compression despite 23/24 exact matches
Apparatus / incumbency mobilization (c2_apparatus_neutrality)	24	2	91.67%	0.780	0.833	Incidental mention of Aparatur Sipil Negara or KPPS neutrality duties without substantive Art. 71 claim
Polling-station / tabulation defect (c4_tabulation_procedural)	24	3	87.50%	0.750	0.750	Boilerplate references to Formulir Model C.Hasil recapitulation tables in pure apparatus petitions
Statutory candidate eligibility (c1_candidate_eligibility)	24	4	83.33%	0.600	0.667	Generic phrase "tidak memenuhi syarat formil" used for petition pleading defects rather than Art. 7(2) candidacy

2.4 Econometric identification, penalized rare-events estimation, and sensitivity protocol

Our econometric strategy models judicial decision-making across three complementary analytical scales (scripts/02_code_and_analyze.py):

First, we test H4 on the continuous bounded proportion of judgment text devoted to judicial reasoning $R_i \in (0, 1)$ across Stratum I ($n_1 = 48$). Model 1A uses Papke and Wooldridge's Fractional Logit Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE)[36]. It maximizes the Bernoulli quasi-log-likelihood $\sum_i [R_i \ln \Lambda(x_i^T \gamma) + (1 - R_i) \ln(1 - \Lambda(x_i^T \gamma))]$ with province-

clustered (CR1) sandwich standard errors (G = 16 provinces). It also reports Average Marginal Effects (AME).

Second, we estimate binary determinants of several outcomes. These are Stage-2 advancement (Model 1B, timely/clear Stratum I cohort, n = 33), Stage-2 substantive relief (Model 2A, complete national Stage-2 census, N_2 = 40), Stage-2 candidate disqualification (Model 2B, N_2 = 40), and pooled substantive relief controlling for stratum selection (Model 3, master corpus, N = 82). Ordinary maximum-likelihood logit suffers from finite-sample upward bias and quasi-complete separation here, because uncorroborated vote-buying claims almost never succeed while Bawaslu-corroborated breaches mostly prevail. We therefore use Firth's Jeffreys-prior penalized logistic regression[37,38], which maximizes the penalized log-likelihood:

$$\ell_{\text{Firth}}(\beta) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} [\, Y_i \ln \pi_i + (1 - Y_i) \ln(1 - \pi_i) \,] + \tfrac{1}{2} \ln \det I(\beta)$$

where $\pi_i = \Lambda(x_i^T \beta) = (1 + \exp(-x_i^T \beta))^{-1}$ and $I(\beta) = X^T W X$ is the Fisher information matrix with diagonal weights $w_i = \pi_i(1 - \pi_i)$. Newton–Raphson iteration solves the modified score equations $U(\beta) = X^T [y - \pi + h \cdot (0.5 - \pi)] = 0$. Here h_i denotes the i-th diagonal of the hat matrix $W^{1/2}X(X^TWX)^{-1}X^TW^{1/2}$. Correlation arises within provinces (G = 27 in Stage-2) and within contests (G = 74 in Model 3, which absorbs multi-petition contests such as Kerinci [120, 125, 126], Banjarbaru [05, 06, 07, 318], Gorontalo Utara [55, 320], and Tasikmalaya [132, 321, 324]). To account for it, we pair unclustered penalized Fisher-information standard errors with small-sample-corrected cluster-robust (CR1) sandwich standard errors scaled by $[G/(G-1)][(n-1)/(n-k)]$[39]. We also report Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), Tjur's coefficient of discrimination (R^2_{Tjur})[40], and area under the ROC curve (AUC).

Third, our pooled two-stratum design (N = 82) oversamples positive relief outcomes ($\bar{y}$ = 26/82 = 0.3171) relative to the true national population of 273 substantive 2025 *Putusan* (τ = 26/273 = 0.09524). Model 3 therefore includes an explicit Stratum II Census Fixed Effect (stratum_ii_only_indicator) to absorb cross-stratum selection. It also applies King and Zeng's choice-based prior correction[31]:

$$\beta_0^* = \hat{\beta}_0 - \ln [\, ((1 - \tau)/\tau) (\bar{y}/(1 - \bar{y})) \,]$$

The correction yields illustrative national relief probabilities across stylized litigant archetypes (P1–P5), on the assumption that the 82 judgments were selected by outcome stage. Finally, a nine-specification sensitivity battery (S1–S9) tests our core estimates under several restrictions and procedures. These are Round-I-only restriction (N = 78), primary-contest de-duplication (N = 74), multi-candidate-only filtering (N = 76), pure Track-B over-threshold waiver testing (N = 45), pure Stratum I estimation (n = 33), 28-province Leave-One-Province-Out (LOPO) jackknifing, King–Zeng calibration, 20,000-replication Monte Carlo exact permutation tests, and region-wide revote restriction.

3. Results

3.1 The two-stage adjudication funnel and the Threshold Overrun Ratio (H1)

Across Indonesia's 2024–2025 simultaneous Pilkada cycle, the Constitutional Court handled disputes through a two-stage institutional funnel under PMK No. 3 of 2024 (Figure 1A). Nationwide, 310 petitions were registered across 23 gubernatorial, 238 regency, and 49 mayoral contests. Of these, 270 (87.10%) ended at Stage 1 on 4–5 February 2025. That group comprised 227 preliminary inadmissibility judgments (*Putusan Tidak Dapat Diterima*), 29 voluntary withdrawals (*Ketetapan Penarikan Kembali*), 8 procedural lapses (*Ketetapan Gugur*), and 6 non-jurisdictional rulings (*Tidak Berwenang*). Only 40 petitions (12.90% of 310 registrations; 14.65% of 273 substantive *Putusan*) advanced to Stage-2 plenary evidentiary trials (7–17 February 2025). Those 40 trial dockets split almost evenly between two procedural tracks. Track A held 22 petitions (55.00%) whose vote margins satisfied Article 158 arithmetically (TOR ≤ 1.00). Track B held 18 petitions (45.00%) whose margins exceeded Article 158 (TOR > 1.00 or uncontested single-ticket configuration), yet which received a preliminary standing deferral (*penundaan keberlakuan Pasal 158*) so that alleged qualitative constitutional defects could be tested at trial. On 24 February 2025, the Court granted substantive constitutional relief in 26 of the 40 trials (65.00%; Clopper–Pearson 95% CI: 48.32%–79.37%). It ordered 11 candidate disqualifications coupled with region-wide revotes, 13 non-disqualification full or targeted polling-station (TPS) revotes, 1 district-level vote recount (305/Puncak Jaya), and 1 certification-decree rectification (274/Jayapura). It rejected 9 Track-A petitions on the merits (22.50%) and re-activated the Article 158 bar post-trial against 5 Track-B petitions (12.50%).



Figure 1. (A) National two-stage constitutional gatekeeping funnel across all 310 registered 2024–2025 Pilkada petitions (273 substantive *Putusan* and 37 *Ketetapan*), isolating Track-A arithmetic compliance (n = 22) versus Track-B deferred standing (n = 18) among the 40 Stage-2 evidentiary trials. (B) Continuous Threshold Overrun Ratio (TOR, logarithmic scale) across Stratum I multi-candidate full-text judgments (n_1 = 44), illustrating the coexistence of strict threshold enforcement at TOR = 1.14x (Kolaka Utara) and explicit threshold waivers up to TOR = 49.05x (Tasikmalaya).

Continuous measurement of TOR across our Stratum I full-text corpus (n_1 = 48 judgments; 44 multi-candidate contests plus 4 single-ticket contests, Table 5 and Figure 1B) supports H1. This fits the asymmetric political payoffs of winner-take-all local executive races[13,14]. Petitioners often litigate very large electoral deficits. Across the 44 multi-candidate Stratum I contests, actual vote margins exceed the statutory Article 158 ceiling by a mean TOR of 18.545x and a median TOR of 10.403x (IQR: 3.044x–24.463x; range 0.312x–70.499x; CV = 1.095; Gini = 0.562). Only 2 of the 44 multi-candidate Stratum I dockets (4.55%) met Article 158 arithmetically. The first was Magetan Regency (30/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 0.312x), with a 1,264-vote deficit against a 4,047-vote 1.0% cap. The second was Lamandau Regency (96/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 0.988x), with a 1,115-vote deficit against a 1,128-vote 2.0% cap.

Yet the Court's enforcement of Article 158 across the remaining 42 over-threshold multi-candidate dockets is non-monotonic in TOR. This is inconsistent with any notion that threshold waivers merely accommodate "near-miss" margins just above the statutory cap:

• **Strict Enforcement at Razor-Thin Overruns (TOR = 1.139x):** In Kolaka Utara Regency (153/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025), total valid votes stood at 82,967, which set a 2.0% statutory margin ceiling of 1,659 votes. The petitioner lost by 1,889 votes (2.28%), which is 230 votes above the ceiling (TOR = 1.139x). The Court's reasoning prints 82,967 valid votes, a ceiling of 1,659 votes and 2.27%; KPU Decision 570/2024, quoted in the same decision, records 82,697 valid votes (ceiling 1,653 votes, deficit 2.28%, TOR = 1.143x)[41]. Bone Bolango (103/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 1.589x) and Kampar (29/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 1.794x) followed the same pattern, with deficits well below 2x the cap. Bawaslu's upstream supervisory reports had found the alleged polling-station and apparatus irregularities either resolved or unsupported by evidence. The Court therefore enforced Article 158 strictly at Stage 1 and dismissed all three petitions as inadmissible.

• **Explicit Constitutional Waivers at Extreme Overruns (TOR = 8.241x to 49.053x):** The opposite occurred in two other dockets. In Gorontalo Utara Regency (55/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025), the petitioner trailed by 12,559 votes (16.48% of 76,229 valid votes) against a 2.0% cap of 1,525 votes (TOR = 8.241x). In Tasikmalaya Regency (132/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025), the petitioner trailed incumbent Regent H. Ade Sugianto by 230,011 votes (24.52% of 937,880 valid votes) against a 0.5% statutory cap of 4,689 votes. That is TOR = 49.053x, nearly fifty times the maximum margin the statute permits. In both cases the Court expressly waived Article 158. It disqualified the winning candidate/ticket under Article 7(2) of Law No. 10 of 2016 and ordered a region-wide revote.

Table 5. Threshold Overrun Ratio (TOR), deliberative reasoning share (*Pertimbangan Hukum*), and landmark gatekeeping extremes in Stratum I (n_1 = 48, 10,198 pages).

Analytical group / Landmark Stratum I docket	Dockets (n)	Valid votes (V)	Vote margin (ΔV)	Art. 158 cap (% / votes)	TOR (x cap)	Pages (pp.)	Reasoning share (%)	Dispositive holding
Panel A: Summary metrics across Stratum I (n_1 = 48)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pre-158 formal dismissals (untimely, obscuur, standing)	15	—	—	0.5%–2.0%	15.32x (med)*	145.6 (mean)	8.82%	Dismissed pre-Art. 158
Stage-1 Art. 158 enforced (*quod non* merits refuted)	27	—	—	0.5%–2.0%	8.59x (med)*	222.5 (mean)	10.71%	Dismissed under Art. 158
Stage-2 plenary trial — denied (merits / post-trial 158)	3	—	—	1.0%–2.0%	4.81x (med)	341.0 (mean)	11.49%	1 Rejected; 2 158 re-activated
Stage-2 plenary trial — substantive relief granted	3	—	—	0.5%–2.0%	8.24x (med)	328.0 (mean)	22.86%	2 Disq. + PSU; 1 4-TPS PSU
Panel B: Landmark Stratum I gatekeeping & mega-contests	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
30/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Magetan)	1	404,694	1,264 (0.31%)	1.0% (4,047)	0.312x	570	24.35%	Granted: 4-TPS PSU
96/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Lamandau)	1	56,395	1,115 (1.98%)	2.0% (1,128)	0.988x	350	14.91%	Rejected on merits after trial
153/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Kolaka Utara)	1	82,967	1,889 (2.28%)	2.0% (1,659)	1.139x	150	10.03%	Barred: +230 votes over cap
183/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Pamekasan)	1	572,293	27,506 (4.81%)	1.0% (5,723)	4.806x	412	8.48%	Deferred -> Post-trial 158 bar
100/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Belu)	1	100,755	12,041 (11.95%)	2.0% (2,015)	5.976x	261	11.09%	Deferred -> Post-trial 158 bar
55/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Gorontalo Utara)	1	76,229	12,559 (16.48%)	2.0% (1,525)	8.241x	173	19.16%	Waived 158 -> Disq. + Full PSU
132/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Tasikmalaya)	1	937,880	230,011 (24.52%)	0.5% (4,689)	49.053x	241	25.07%	Waived 158 -> Disq. + Full PSU
265/PHPU.GUB-XXIII/2025 (Prov. Jawa Timur)	1	20,732,592	5,449,070 (26.28%)	0.5% (103,663)	52.565x	314	13.09%	Barred: Sirekap claim refuted
247/PHPU.GUB-XXIII/2025 (Prov. Sumatera Utara)	1	5,654,922	1,636,300 (28.94%)	0.5% (28,275)	57.871x	311	10.67%	Barred: Flood PSU held lawful
321/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025 (Kab. Tasikmalaya Post-PSU I)	1	886,782	312,593 (35.25%)	0.5% (4,434)	70.499x	269	8.27%	Barred: Round-II challenge

Note. *Group medians exclude the 4 single-ticket empty-box dockets (06/Banjarbaru, 07/Banjarbaru, 131/Gresik, and 318/Banjarbaru Post-PSU). Across all 44 multi-candidate Stratum I dockets, TOR median = 10.403x (IQR: 3.044x–24.463x; mean = 18.545x; Gini = 0.562).

Belu Regency (100/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 5.976x) and Pamekasan Regency (183/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 4.806x) show how conditional Track-B deferral works in practice. Both petitions exceeded Article 158 by roughly five-fold to sixfold. Both were still admitted into Stage-2 plenary evidentiary trials (7–17 February 2025), because their pleadings raised facially colorable threshold-piercing claims: a C1 deputy-regent ex-convict disclosure issue under Article 7(2)(g) in Belu, and cascading TPS ballot irregularities in Pamekasan. At trial, witness cross-examination and documentary verification showed that Belu's deputy-regent candidate had lawfully announced his prior conviction status. They also showed that Pamekasan's irregularities did not amount to systemic fraud. The Court then re-activated Article 158 in [4.6] ("Pemohon tidak memiliki *kedudukan hukum*") and declared both petitions inadmissible after trial. Article 158 thus works not as an ex-ante door-lock but as a conditional burden-shifting presumption. It returns to force whenever an over-threshold petitioner fails to prove a qualifying constitutional defect.

3.2 Stage-2 census, relief pathways, and uncorroborated vote-buying claims (H2 and H3)

We examined the complete national census of all 40 Stage-2 evidentiary-trial judgments (Stratum II, $N_2 = 40$, Table 6) together with our aligned multivariate regression models (Models 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, and 3, Table 7 and Figure 2). Together they support H2 and H3.

Table 6. Complete national census of all forty Stage-2 plenary evidentiary-trial decisions (Stratum II, $N_2 = 40$, pronounced 24 February 2025) by procedural track, substantive ground, and constitutional remedy.

Remedy / Disposition category (24 Feb 2025)	Trials (N_2)	Share (%)	Track A (TOR ≤ 1)	Track B (TOR > 1)	C1 Elig. (n)	Bawaslu Corrob. (n)	Complete docket roster (40/40 national Stage-2 Putusan)
1. Candidate Disqualification + Region-Wide PSU	11	27.50%	2	9	10	8	02/Pasaman, 20/Pesawaran, 55/Gorontalo Utara, 68/Bengkulu Selatan, 75/Parigi Moutong, 132/Tasikmalaya, 168/Palopo, 195/Kutai Kartanegara, 224/Mahakam Ulu, 260/Boven Digoel, 304/Prov. Papua
2. Non-Disqualification Region-Wide PSU	3	7.50%	0	3	1	1	05/Kota Banjarbaru (single-ticket blank-column plebiscite), 24/Empat Lawang (excluded two-term ticket restored), 70/Serang (ministerial & village-head TSM mobilization)
3. Non-Disqualification Targeted TPS PSU	10	25.00%	10	0	0	10	28/Barito Utara, 30/Magetan*, 47/Kota Sabang, 51/Kep. Talaud, 73/Siak, 99/Bangka Barat, 171/Banggai, 173/Bungo, 174/Buru, 267/Pulau Taliabu
4. District Vote Recount / Decree Rectification	2	5.00%	1	1	0	2	305/Puncak Jaya (*noken* diversion recount across 4 districts); 274/Jayapura (certification decree text rectification)
Subtotal: Substantive Constitutional Relief Granted	26	65.00%	13	13	11	21	24 PSU revote mandates + 1 vote recount + 1 decree rectification (95% CI: 48.32%–79.37%)
5. Rejected on the Merits (Ditolak)	9	22.50%	9	0	1	1	04/Buton Tengah, 32/Mandailing Natal, 43/Pasaman Barat, 44/Aceh Timur, 81/Berau, 96/Lamandau*, 232/Jeneponto, 266/Prov. Kep. Bangka Belitung, 283/Puncak
6. Post-Trial Inadmissible (Pasal 158 Re-activated)	5	12.50%	0	5	2	1	93/Halmahera Utara, 100/Belu, 183/Pamekasan, 272/Mimika, 293/Prov. Papua Pegunungan
Total National Stage-2 Evidentiary-Trial Census	40	100.00%	22	18	14	23	Complete 100% national Stage-2 trial universe (27 provinces)

Note. *Asterisk marks the 6 cross-stratum anchor dockets simultaneously analyzed in full verbatim PDF in Stratum I. Every docket number corresponds to suffix /PHPU.GUB-XXIII/2025, /PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, or /PHPU.WAKO-XXIII/2025.

Table 6 and Figure 2B show a clear structural division of labor between Track A and Track B:

1. Track-B Waivers Command Severe Systemic Remedies (13/18 Granted = 72.22%): When an over-threshold Track-B petition survives into Stage 2, it wins relief at a slightly higher rate (13/18 = 72.22%) than arithmetic Track-A petitions (13/22 = 59.09%). Each Track-B grant remedies a defect that reaches beyond a single polling station. These comprise 9 candidate disqualifications + region-wide PSU (02/Pasaman, 20/Pesawaran, 55/Gorontalo Utara, 68/Bengkulu Selatan, 75/Parigi Moutong, 132/Tasikmalaya, 195/Kutai Kartanegara, 224/Mahakam Ulu, and 260/Boven Digoel), 3 non-disqualification region-wide PSU orders (05/Banjarbaru, 24/Empat Lawang, and 70/Serang), and 1 multi-district *noken* recount (305/Puncak Jaya). Fisher's exact test shows that Track-B over-threshold trials are 10.00 times more likely to end in candidate disqualification than Track-A trials (9/18 [50.0%] vs 2/22 [9.1%]; $p_{raw} = 0.0056$, Holm-adjusted $p_{Holm} = 0.0056$).

2. Pathway I — Article 7(2) Candidate Eligibility Dominates Disqualification (10/11 Disqualifications = 90.91%): Of the 11 candidate disqualifications nationwide, 10 (90.91%) arose directly from statutory candidate-eligibility violations (C1). 5 were ex-convict cooling-off or dishonest non-disclosure violations under Article 7(2)(g) (02/Pasaman, 55/Gorontalo Utara, 75/Parigi Moutong, 260/Boven Digoel, and 304/Papua). In 304/Papua the violation was a domicile-based defect in the court certificates (Article 7(2)(g)–(h))[42], not a conviction record. 3 were two-term incumbency violations under Article 7(2)(n) (68/Bengkulu Selatan, 132/Tasikmalaya, and 195/Kutai Kartanegara), to which 24/Empat Lawang is added, where improper two-term exclusion triggered a full revote. 2 involved invalid high-school equivalency/Paket C diploma credentials under Article 7(2)(c) (20/Pesawaran and 168/Palopo). Only one disqualification in the entire republic rested on non-eligibility TSM campaign misconduct. That was Mahakam Ulu (224/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025), where the incumbent regent orchestrated formalized TSM political contracts binding village officials (ketua RT and kepala kampung) with regional budget allocations. Across $N_2 = 40$, C1 yields a Fisher odds ratio of 62.50 for candidate disqualification ($p_{raw} = 1.14 \times 10^{-5}$, $p_{Holm} = 4.57 \times 10^{-5}$).

3. Pathway II — Upstream Bawaslu Corroboration Is Associated With Operational & Polling-Station Relief (21/23 = 91.30%): All 10 targeted polling-station PSU orders (100%) occurred in arithmetic Track-A contests (TOR ≤ 1.0) backed by upstream Bawaslu supervisory corroboration (28/Barito Utara, 30/Magetan, 47/Sabang, 51/Talaud,

73/Siak, 99/Bangka Barat, 171/Banggai, 173/Bungo, 174/Buru, and 267/Pulau Taliabu). 5 Stage-2 grants (05/Banjarbaru, 24/Empat Lawang, 68/Bengkulu Selatan, 132/Tasikmalaya, and 195/Kutai Kartanegara) succeeded without an upstream Bawaslu violation finding (bawaslu_corroboration = 0). Why? In all five, regional KPU and Bawaslu had relied on formalistic administrative rules. One was PKPU No. 8 of 2024, which counts two-term incumbency from ceremonial inauguration rather than actual acting service. The other was K*eputusan* KPU No. 1774 of 2024, which counts uncontested single-ticket ballots without a blank plebiscite column. The Constitutional Court exercised direct constitutional override. Where petitioners alleged operational election-day fraud with neither a C1 constitutional override nor Bawaslu corroboration (Figure 2B, rightmost bar), 87.5% (7/8) were rejected on the merits.



Figure 2. (A) Aligned Firth penalized logistic regression odds ratios and cluster-robust (CR1) 95% confidence intervals across Model 2A (Stage-2 substantive relief, $N_2 = 40$), Model 2B (Stage-2 candidate disqualification, $N_2 = 40$), and Model 3 (pooled corpus relief with Stratum II fixed effect, N = 82). (B) Empirical remedy stratification across all 40 Stage-2 plenary evidentiary trials grouped by dominant legal ground and threshold track.

Our multivariate Firth penalized logistic regressions (Table 7 and Figure 2A; all covariates well-conditioned with max VIF = 2.71) indicate that these two pathways operate independently, even after controlling for apparatus claims (C2), vote-buying claims (C3), Track-A arithmetic compliance, and cross-stratum selection:

• In Model 2A (Stage-2 substantive relief, $N_2 = 40$, G = 27 province clusters, $R^2_{Tjur} = 0.609$, AUC = 0.964), upstream Bawaslu corroboration multiplies the odds of constitutional relief by 76.15 (CR1 95% CI: 29.99–193.38, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$). Article 7(2) candidate-eligibility claims (C1) independently multiply relief odds by 5.07 (CR1 95% CI: 1.27–20.23, $p_{CR1} = 0.022$).

• In Model 2B (Stage-2 candidate disqualification, $N_2 = 40$, $R^2_{Tjur} = 0.648$, AUC = 0.981), Article 7(2) candidate eligibility (C1) rises to a penalized odds ratio of 101.64 (CR1 95% CI: 48.39–213.49, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$; Firth Fisher p = 0.019). Bawaslu corroboration shows the same direction (OR = 32.37, CR1 95% CI: 10.83–96.77, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$). Track-A arithmetic compliance is significantly negatively associated with disqualification (OR = 0.22, $p_{CR1} = 0.019$), because narrow-margin TPS errors call for targeted precinct revotes rather than candidate removal.

• In Model 3 (pooled master corpus, N = 82, G = 74 contest clusters, $R^2_{Tjur} = 0.726$, AUC = 0.984), we control explicitly for the Stratum II census fixed effect (OR = 3.74). Bawaslu supervisory corroboration (OR = 519.68, CR1 95% CI: 133.46–2,023.65, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$; Firth p = 0.005) and Article 7(2) candidate eligibility (OR = 14.32, CR1 95% CI: 3.47–59.13, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$; Firth p = 0.031) both remain strong positive determinants of constitutional relief.

The evidence for H3 is also clear. Across all 82 judgments, 40 petitions (48.78%) alleged TSM vote buying (C3). Among the 24 petitions alleging TSM vote buying without either Bawaslu supervisory corroboration or an Article 7(2) eligibility defect, none obtained relief (0/24 = 0.00%). The comparison group of other petitions succeeded in 26/58 (44.83%) of cases (Fisher exact $p_{raw} = 1.57 \times 10^{-5}$, $p_{Holm} = 4.72 \times 10^{-5}$). Conditionally, uncorroborated C3 vote-buying allegations carry a strongly negative penalized odds ratio in both Model 2A (OR = 0.15, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$) and Model 3 (OR = 0.04, CR1 95% CI: 0.01–0.14, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$; Firth p = 0.044). Uncorroborated C2 apparatus-partiality claims behave the same way (OR = 0.08, $p_{CR1} < 0.001$). Cash patronage crosses the Court's constitutional threshold only in two situations. One is documentation by official Bawaslu enforcement, as in 28/Barito Utara and 99/Bangka Barat (targeted TPS revotes) or 224/Mahakam Ulu (notarized political contracts). The other is fusion with documented ministerial/village-head mobilization (70/Serang)[22–24].

Table 7. Exact contingency tests with Holm–Bonferroni multiplicity adjustment and aligned econometric regression estimates (Models 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, and 3).

Panel / Covariate or hypothesis test	Model 1A: Reasoning Share QMLE (n_1=48)	Model 1B: Stratum I Stage-2 (n=33)	Model 2A: Stage-2 Relief (N_2=40)	Model 2B: Stage-2 Disq. (N_2=40)	Model 3: Pooled Relief + FE (N=82)
Panel A: Multivariate Regression Estimates	AME (CR1 SE)	OR (CR1 95% CI)	OR (CR1 95% CI)	OR (CR1 95% CI)	OR (CR1 95% CI)
Candidate Eligibility Defect (C1, Art. 7(2))	+0.010 (0.023)	2.13 (0.17–26.69)	5.07* (1.27–20.23)	101.64*** (48.39–213.49)	14.32*** (3.47–59.13)
Bawaslu Supervisory Corroboration (PK record)	+0.086*** (0.012)	13.64** (2.87–64.85)	76.15*** (29.99–193.38)	32.37*** (10.83–96.77)	519.68*** (133.46–2,023.65)
Apparatus Neutrality Claim (C2, Art. 71)	—	—	0.04*** (0.01–0.11)	2.43 (0.63–9.34)	0.08*** (0.02–0.32)
TSM Vote-Buying Claim (C3, Arts. 73/135A)	—	0.35 (0.06–2.15)	0.15*** (0.05–0.40)	1.41 (0.29–6.81)	0.04*** (0.01–0.14)
Within Art. 158 Gate (Track A, TOR ≤ 1.0)	+0.055 (0.039)	—	0.46 (0.07–2.87)	0.22* (0.06–0.77)	1.20 (0.10–14.37)
Log_{10}(TOR) / Pre-158 Defect / Log_{10}(Votes)	-0.023 (Pre-158)	0.36 (Log_{10} TOR)	—	—	—
Stratum II Census Fixed Effect (MK49–MK82)	—	—	—	—	3.74 (0.44–31.67)
Intercept ($\hat{\beta}_0$) [King–Zeng shifted β_0*]	-1.837* (0.819)	-0.367 (0.762)	1.721* (0.818)	-5.356*** (0.864)	-1.237* [-2.721]
Observations (n) / Clusters (G)	48 / 16 prov.	33 / 13 prov.	40 / 27 prov.	40 / 27 prov.	82 / 74 contests
Goodness of fit (R^2_{NL} or R^2_{Tjur} / AUC)	R^2_{NL} = 0.300	0.193 / 0.753	0.609 / 0.964	0.648 / 0.981	0.726 / 0.984
Maximum Variance Inflation Factor (max VIF)	1.20	1.09	1.61	1.61	2.71
Panel B: Exact 2x2 Contingency Tests	Cell counts	Exact OR	Raw Fisher p	Holm-adj. p	Substantive inference
T1: C1 Eligibility -> Disqualification (N_2=40)	[10, 4; 1, 25]	62.50	1.14×10^{-5}	4.57×10^{-5}	71.4% vs 3.8% disqualified
T2: Bawaslu Corrob. -> Stage-2 Relief (N_2=40)	[21, 2; 5, 12]	25.20	1.05×10^{-4}	2.10×10^{-4}	91.3% vs 29.4% granted relief
T3: Pure Uncorrob. C3 -> Relief (N=82)	[0, 24; 26, 32]	0.00	1.57×10^{-5}	4.72×10^{-5}	0.0% (0/24) relief rate
T4: Track-B (TOR > 1) -> Disq. (N_2=40)	[9, 9; 2, 20]	10.00	0.0056	0.0056	50.0% vs 9.1% disqualified

Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 based on small-sample-corrected cluster-robust (CR1) sandwich standard errors. Because CR1 sandwich variance can narrow relative to unclustered Fisher information in small penalized samples (N_2 = 40) when within-cluster score residuals negatively covary, both CR1 and unclustered penalized Fisher standard errors are archived in data/analysis_results.json; in Model 3 (N = 82), C1 (p_{Firth} = 0.031, p_{CR1} = 0.0002) and Bawaslu (p_{Firth} = 0.005, p_{CR1} < 0.0001) are statistically significant under both estimators.

3.3 Deliberative reasoning, national prior correction, and longitudinal sagas (H4)

We tested H4 against the internal architecture of the 48 full-text Stratum I judgments (10,198 pages). Even Stage-1 "summary" dismissals average 212.5 pages. Sections 1 and 2 transcribe long party pleadings and Bawaslu exhibit logs, and Section 3 (*Pertimbangan Hukum*) runs an inverted merits-before-standing audit before Article 158 is applied. Across Stratum I (Figure 3A and Table 5), the share of judgment text given to *Pertimbangan Hukum* rises across the four groups. It is 8.82% in pre-Article 158 formal dismissals (n = 15), 10.71% in Stage-1 Article 158 *quod non* dismissals (n = 27), and 11.49% in denied Stage-2 trials (n = 3). It reaches 22.86% in Stage-2 judgments granting revotes or disqualifications (n = 3: 19.16% in 55/Gorontalo Utara, 24.35% in 30/Magetan, and 25.07% in 132/Tasikmalaya; Kruskal–Wallis H = 8.33, p = 0.0155; Mann–Whitney Stage-2 vs Stage-1 Article 158 p = 0.0376). In Model 1A (Papke–Wooldridge Fractional Logit QMLE, Table 7), upstream Bawaslu corroboration is associated with a judicial reasoning share higher by 8.59 percentage points (AME = +0.0859, CR1 SE = 0.0121, z = 7.11, p < 0.001).

King and Zeng's (2001) prior correction, applied to Model 3 (τ = 26/273 = 0.09524, intercept shift $\Delta\ \beta_0$ = -1.484, Figure 3B), converts our sample estimates into illustrative national relief probabilities. These are reported for five stylized litigant archetypes:

- **Archetype P1 (Over-Threshold + Pure Uncorroborated Vote Buying):** National relief probability = 0.02% (0.0002).
- **Archetype P2 (Within-Threshold + Uncorroborated Apparatus Claim):** National relief probability = 0.62% (0.0062).
- **Archetype P3 (Over-Threshold + Two-Term Incumbency Eligibility Defect Without Bawaslu Recommendation):** National relief probability = 48.52% (0.4852). This archetype covers high-stakes contests over constitutional interpretation, such as Tasikmalaya (132), Bengkulu Selatan (68), and Kutai Kartanegara (195).
- **Archetype P4 (Within-Threshold + Polling-Station Defect Corroborated by Bawaslu PSU Recommendation):** National relief probability = 97.62% (0.9762).
- **Archetype P5 (Over-Threshold + Article 7(2) Candidate-Eligibility Defect Corroborated by Official Judicial/Bawaslu Exhibits):** National relief probability = 99.80% (0.9980).



Figure 3. (A) Distribution of judicial reasoning share (Section 3 *Pertimbangan Hukum* as % of full judgment text) across Stratum I (n_1 = 48 judgments, 10,198 pages). (B) King–Zeng prior-corrected national probabilities of substantive constitutional relief (τ = 9.52% national *Putusan* base rate) across five canonical litigant archetypes (P1–P5).

Stratum I holds both the February 2025 initial judgments and the May 2025 post-PSU judgments (318, 320, 321, 324). The corpus therefore lets us follow three complete Round-I-to-Round-II constitutional sagas. They show how the Court's remedies reshaped electoral reality, and why Round-II challenges were closed:

1. The Kota Banjarbaru Single-Candidate Plebiscite Saga (06 & 07 -> 05 -> 318/PHPU.WAKO-XXIII/2025): On 31 October 2024, the rival ticket Aditya Mufti Ariffin–Said Abdullah was administratively disqualified shortly before polling day. KPU Kota Banjarbaru had already printed two-column ballots. It applied Ke*putusan* KPU No. 1774 of 2024 and treated 78,736 ballots cast for the disqualified column as "invalid" rather than as blank-box dissent. The sole remaining candidate, Erna Lisa Halaby–Wartono, was certified as winner with only 36,135 valid votes (31.46% of 114,871 ballots). In Round I, two individual citizen-voter petitions (06 and 07 in Stratum I) were dismissed at Stage 1. The petitioners lacked standing: Article 157(4) of Law No. 10/2016 admits candidate pairs only, and Article 4(1)(d) of PMK No. 3/2024 admits KPU-accredited election observers only where a single pair contests. The accredited observer LS Vinus (05/PHPU.WAKO-XXIII/2025 in Stratum II)[43] prevailed at Stage 2. Invoking MK Decision No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015[44–46], the Court held that negating 78,736 dissenting ballots violated democratic plebiscite principles under Article 18(4) UUD 1945. It ordered a city-wide PSU in which Halaby–Wartono would face an explicit blank column (*kolom kosong*). In the April 2025 PSU, Halaby–Wartono won 56,043 votes (52.15%) against 51,415 blank-column votes (47.85%). A new challenge (318/PHPU.WAKO-XXIII/2025, filed by the observer LPRI, with a voter petition in 319/PHPU.WAKO-XXIII/2025) then alleged post-PSU money politics, with no Bawaslu corroboration. The Court dismissed it on 26 May 2025, which finalized the mandate.

2. The Kabupaten Tasikmalaya Two-Term Incumbency Saga (132 -> 321 & 324/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025): In Round I (132), petitioner Cecep Nurul Yakin–Asep Sopari Al-Ayubi trailed by 230,011 votes (TOR = 49.053x). Through official Ministry of Home Affairs and gubernatorial telegram exhibits (Bukti PT-5 & PT-6)[47], they showed that incumbent H. Ade Sugianto had served as Acting Regent from 5 September to 3 December 2018 and then continued as regent until 23 March 2021, a continuous period of 2 years, 6 months, and 18 days that counts as one term. Together with his later term, that amounted to two legal terms under MK Decisions No. 22/PUU-VII/2009, 2/PUU-XXI/2023, and 129/PUU-XXII/2024[48,49]. The Court weighed constitutional integrity against party-coalition proportionality. It waived Article 158 and disqualified Ade Sugianto individually. His nominating coalition kept the right to field a replacement candidate, Hj. Ai Diantani Sugianto, alongside the eligible running mate Iip Miftahul Paoz. In the subsequent April 2025 PSU (886,782 valid votes), Round-I petitioner Cecep–Asep won with 465,150 votes (52.45%). The defeated rivals filed two Round-II petitions (321 with TOR = 70.499x and 324 with TOR = 44.222x). All Bawaslu supervision was found clean, and the Court enforced Article 158 on 26 May 2025.

3. The Kabupaten Gorontalo Utara Criminal-Conviction Disqualification Saga (55 -> 320/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025): In Round I (55), Bawaslu's supervisory dossier (Bukti PK.31.5-23 vs PK.31.5-26)[50] showed that candidate Ridwan Yasin held a final Supreme Court cassation conviction (*Putusan* MA No. 327K/Pid/2024, dated 25 April 2024). This contradicted his District Court non-convict certificate (Nomor 405/SK/HK/08/2024/PN Gto). The Court waived an 8.241x TOR, disqualified Ridwan Yasin, and ordered a region-wide PSU. In the April 2025 PSU, the Round-I runner-up Thariq Modanggu–Nurjanah Hasan Yusuf reversed their earlier loss and won 37,985 to 35,345 votes. The replacement ticket then challenged the PSU (320/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, TOR = 1.790x) on the basis of 11 belated complaints. Bawaslu had declared all of them materially deficient (*Formulir Model A.17*), and the Court enforced Article 158 on 26 May 2025.

3.4 Sensitivity and robustness battery (S1–S9)

Table 8 reports our nine-specification sensitivity battery (S1–S9), indicating that our core empirical conclusions are stable across alternative sample definitions, clustering schemes, non-parametric permutation tests, and outcome operationalizations:

Table 8. Nine-specification econometric sensitivity, subsample, jackknife, prior-correction, and permutation battery (S1–S9).

Sensitivity check & methodological threat addressed	Sample (n)	C1 Eligibility OR (CR1 p)	Bawaslu Corrob. OR (CR1 p)	C3 Vote Buying OR	Model AUC / Diagnostic	Robustness verdict
Baseline (Model 3, Pooled Two-Stratum + FE)	82	14.32 (p = 0.0002)	519.68 (p < 0.0001)	0.035	AUC = 0.9835	Reference benchmark
S1: Round-I Initial Cycle Only (drops 26 May 2025 post-PSU dockets)	78	13.61 (p = 0.0002)	551.33 (p < 0.0001)	0.033	AUC = 0.9822	Fully invariant
S2: Strictly De-duplicated Contests (1 primary docket per contest)	74	12.55 (p = 0.0003)	770.51 (p < 0.0001)	0.023	AUC = 0.9800	Eliminates sibling-docket clustering
S3: Multi-Candidate Contests Only (drops 6 single-ticket dockets)	76	12.82 (p = 0.0005)	536.63 (p < 0.0001)	0.040	AUC = 0.9824	Robust to *kotak kosong* exclusion
S4: Pure Track-B Over-Threshold Cohort (TOR > 1.0, formal Art. 158 waiver)	45	11.18 (p = 0.0008)	128.91 (p < 0.0001)	0.069	AUC = 0.9784	Directly identifies Art. 158 waivers
S5: Pure Stratum I Timely/Clear Cohort (Model 1B, no Stratum II)	33	2.13 (p = 0.5590)	13.64 (p = 0.0010)	0.349	AUC = 0.7531	Bawaslu robust; justifies Stratum II census for C1 power
S6: Leave-One-Province-Out (LOPO) Jackknife (28 provinces)	75–81	Range [10.85, 37.25]	Range [266.77, 968.32]	< 0.06 in all 28	28 / 28 p < 0.001	Zero single-province outlier leverage
S7: King–Zeng National Prior Correction (τ = 26/273 = 9.52%)	82 -> 273	Shift $\Delta\beta_0$ = -1.484	P4 = 97.6%, P5 = 99.8%	P1 = 0.02%	Exact choice-based offset	Calibrated to national *Putusan* universe
S8: 20,000-Replication Monte Carlo Exact Permutation	82	ΔRisk = +20.0 pp (p = 0.116)*	ΔRisk = +80.9 pp (p = 0.00005)	0 / 24 uncorrob.	Distribution-free exact test	Confirms C1 requires documentary verification
S9: Region-Wide Revote / Disqualification Only (14 full PSUs)	82	24.51 (p < 0.0001)	17.35 (p = 0.0233)	0.388	AUC = 0.9821	C1 becomes #1 predictor of full-region revotes

Note. *In S8, the unconditional bivariate permutation p-value for C1 across N = 82 (p = 0.116) illuminates a vital substantive nuance: in Stratum I Stage 1, 9 petitioners asserted speculative nomination challenges (e.g., name spelling in 79/Takalar or verified Dapodik diplomas in 157/Lima Puluh Kota) that were immediately refuted by KPU/Bawaslu records; once narrowed to Stage-2 verified trials (Table 7, T1, Fisher OR = 62.50, p = 1.14 × 10^{-5}) or controlled in Model 3 (OR = 14.32, p = 0.0002) and S9 (OR = 24.51, p < 0.0001), C1 is overwhelmingly decisive.

4. Discussion

4.1 Four-canon doctrinal analysis

Why does the Constitutional Court apply Article 158 rigidly to a 230-vote overrun in Kolaka Utara (TOR = 1.139x), yet set it aside against a 230,011-vote margin in Tasikmalaya (TOR = 49.053x)? We read the Court's verbatim *Pertimbangan Hukum* across our Stratum I transcripts through four classical canons of statutory and constitutional interpretation (grammatical, systematic, teleological, and historical hermeneutics). The result is a set of coherent doctrinal rules, not ad-hoc judicial activism:

1. Grammatical Interpretation (Interpretasi Gramatikal) and the Textual Tension of Article 158: Taken in isolation, the wording of Article 158(1)–(2) of Law No. 10 of 2016—"Peserta Pemilihan dapat mengajukan permohonan pembatalan penetapan hasil penghitungan perolehan suara dengan ketentuan..." ("Election participants may file a petition to annul the determination of vote-count results subject to the requirement...")—sets an explicit arithmetic precondition (0.5% to 2.0%). It attaches to the object defined in Article 156(2): disputes over vote-count determinations that affect a candidate's election. Grammatically, however, a "valid vote count" (perolehan suara yang sah) presupposes a legally qualified candidate (pasangan calon yang memenuhi syarat) on a constitutionally valid ballot. Suppose a winning candidate was ab initio ineligible under Article 7(2). Then every ballot cast for that ticket carries a defect in its legal predicate, and an arithmetic comparison of vote shares becomes conceptually circular.

2. Systematic Interpretation (Interpretasi Sistematis) After MK Decision No. 85/PUU-XX/2022 and MK Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025: The legislature originally built Law No. 10 of 2016 as a fragmented multi-agency architecture. Bawaslu policed administrative and TSM money-politics violations (Articles 73, 134–135A, 139–140). State Administrative High Courts (PT TUN) and the Supreme Court reviewed nomination disputes (Article 154). The Constitutional Court served only as an interim calculator until a special electoral court was created (Article 157(1)–(3)). Two constitutional transformations broke up that compartmentalization. First, MK Decision No. 85/PUU-XX/2022 made the Constitutional Court the permanent apex guardian of regional electoral constitutionality, and barred it from ignoring failures of upstream administrative remedies. Second, our verbatim Stratum I transcripts reveal the institutional pathology that afflicted Bawaslu enforcement before 2025. Under old Articles 139–140 of the Pilkada Law, Bawaslu's administrative outputs were framed as mere recommendations (*rekomendasi*) to KPU. General national elections under Law No. 7 of 2017 differ, because Bawaslu there issues binding adjudicative decisions (*putusan*). In Magetan Regency (30/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, Stratum I, p. 120), the verbatim supervisory record shows how Panwaslu Kecamatan Bendo caught deceased/absentee voter roll abuse at TPS 001 Desa Kinandang and formally recommended a revote. KPU's subdistrict committee then brushed the recommendation aside:

> *"Terhadap hasil pengawasan tersebut, Panwaslu Kecamatan Bendo menerbitkan surat rekomendasi pelanggaran administrasi nomor 173/PM.02.02/K.JI-13/12/2024 kepada PPK Kecamatan Bendo, tanggal 6 Desember 2024 yang pada pokoknya penyalahgunaan data Pemilih TPS 001 Desa Kinandang Kecamatan Bendo Kabupaten Magetan, sehingga perlu dilakukan Pemungutan Suara Ulang (PSU). [Vide Bukti PK.16.20-11] Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan Bendo mengeluarkan surat tindak lanjut rekomendasi Panwascam Bendo Nomor 04/PY.02-SD/3520/2024 tanggal 7 Desember 2024 yang pada pokoknya tindak lanjut PPK Kecamatan Bendo atas surat rekomendasi Panwas Kecamatan Bendo adalah dengan merujuk pada Pasal 8 ayat (2) Peraturan KPU Nomor 15 Tahun 2024 sebagai penyelesaiannya."*
>
> (English translation: "Upon those supervisory findings, the Bendo Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committee issued administrative violation recommendation letter No.

173/PM.02.02/K.JI-13/12/2024 to the Bendo Subdistrict Election Committee [PPK] dated 6 December 2024, essentially finding voter-data abuse at Polling Station 001 of Kinandang Village, Bendo Subdistrict, Magetan Regency, requiring a Repeat Voting [PSU] [Vide Exhibit PK.16.20-11]. The Bendo PPK issued follow-up letter No. 04/PY.02-SD/3520/2024 dated 7 December 2024, essentially disposing of the recommendation merely by citing Article 8(2) of KPU Regulation No. 15 of 2024.")

This institutional impasse illustrates the gap that Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025 (30 July 2025, prospective) later addressed. The decision declared the non-binding "*rekomendasi*" nomenclature conditionally unconstitutional. It also raised Bawaslu's Pilkada administrative violation determinations to final and binding adjudicative decisions (*putusan*) that KPU must obey. A similar conflict arose over two-term incumbency limits under Article 7(2)(n). KPU promulgated Article 19(e) of PKPU No. 8 of 2024, which counts incumbency from ceremonial inauguration (*sejak pelantikan*). That rule conflicted with the reading of MK Decisions No. 22/PUU-VII/2009, 2/PUU-XXI/2023, and 129/PUU-XXII/2024, which count actual acting-regent service (*menjalankan tugas*); the Court set the rule aside in application in 132/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025. In Tasikmalaya Regency (132/PHPU.BUP-XXIII/2025, Stratum I, [4.4] & [4.7], pp. 240–241), the Court put constitutional supremacy above subordinate administrative clearance:

> *"[4.4] Mahkamah mengesampingkan keberlakuan Pasal 158 UU 10/2016; [4.5] Eksepsi Termohon dan eksepsi Pihak Terkait berkenaan dengan kedudukan hukum Pemohon tidak beralasan menurut hukum; ... [4.7] Permohonan Pemohon beralasan menurut hukum untuk sebagian."*
>
> (English translation: "[4.4] The Court sets aside the applicability of Article 158 of Law No. 10/2016; [4.5] The Respondent's and Related Party's exceptions regarding the Petitioner's legal standing are legally unfounded; ... [4.7] The Petitioner's petition is legally well-founded in part.")

3. Teleological Interpretation (Interpretasi Teleologis) and Evidentiary Proportionality: Teleologically, Article 18(4) and Article 22E(1) UUD 1945 forbid using a statutory speed-rule (Article 158) to validate an unconstitutional candidacy. 55/Gorontalo Utara is the example: *Putusan* MA No. 327K/Pid/2024 established criminal convict status despite District Court certificate 405/SK/HK/08/2024/PN Gto: "[4.7] Pemohon memiliki *kedudukan hukum* untuk mengajukan permohonan a quo dengan menyimpangi syarat formil Pasal 158 ayat (2) UU 10/2016" — "The Petitioner possesses legal standing to file the instant petition by departing from the formal requirement of Article 158(2) of Law 10/2016". Teleological proportionality also explains the opposite outcome. The Court rejects uncorroborated C3 vote-buying and algorithmic tabulation claims in very large contests such as East Java (265/PHPU.GUB-XXIII/2025, 20.73 million valid votes, TOR = 52.565x) and North Sumatra (247/PHPU.GUB-XXIII/2025, 5.65 million valid votes, TOR = 57.871x). Article 157(8) sets a 45-working-day ceiling and PMK No. 3/2024 limits witnesses. Annulling millions of lawfully cast ballots on the strength of sporadic social-media videos, or of misunderstandings about Sirekap optical-character aids (when manual tiered Formulir Model C.Hasil and D.Hasil tallies matched across subdistricts), would undermine popular sovereignty instead of protecting it. In the Stage-1 dismissals (183/Pamekasan, 153/Kolaka Utara, 265/Jawa Timur), the Court therefore uses its canonical *quod non* closure:

> *"[4.6] Pemohon tidak memiliki kedudukan hukum untuk mengajukan permohonan a quo; [4.7] Andaipun Pemohon memiliki kedudukan hukum, quod non, permohonan Pemohon tidak beralasan menurut hukum."*
>
> (English translation: "[4.6] The Petitioner lacks legal standing to file the instant petition; [4.7] Even if the Petitioner possessed legal standing, *quod non* [which is not the case], the Petitioner's petition is legally unfounded.")

4. Historical Interpretation (Interpretasi Historis): Constitutional Court Pilkada jurisprudence has passed through three eras. Era I (2008–2013) began with expansive TSM equitable review in East Java 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008. Era II (2015–2018) followed the enactment of Article 158 in Law No. 8/2015 and Law No. 10/2016, and it applied rigid arithmetic gatekeeping. Era III (2020–2025) is best described as Institutionalized Conditional Gatekeeping. Our 2025 jurimetric evidence shows that Era III neither returns to the unbounded discretion of Era-I nor falls back on the mechanical formalism of Era-II. It builds a two-key evidentiary lock instead. A petitioner must present either objective documentary proof of candidate ineligibility (C1) or formal Bawaslu supervisory corroboration.

4.2 Comparative threshold architecture in four jurisdictions

Table 9 and Figure 4 place Indonesia's Article 158 jurisprudence beside that of Kenya, Mexico, the Philippines, and Germany. Each of these constitutional democracies handles a large volume of election disputes, and each faces the same tension between quantitative outcome determinacy and qualitative constitutional integrity. Their statutory or procedural texts resolve that tension with greater clarity than the current Pilkada text in Indonesia does.

Table 9. Four-jurisdiction functional-equivalence matrix on electoral threshold gatekeeping, qualitative nullity, and proportional remedies.

Comparative dimension	Indonesia (Art. 158 Law 10/2016 & PMK 3/2024)	Kenya (Constitution Art. 140 & Elections Act s. 83)	Mexico (Constitution Art. 41-VI & TEPJF Doctrine)	Philippines (PET Rule 65 pilot-province rule)	Germany (Art. 41 GG & BVerfG Mandatsrelevanz)
Statutory gatekeeping rule	Ex-ante 0.5%–2.0% population-tiered vote-margin bar framed as legal standing	Disjunctive test (s. 83): non-compliance with constitutional principles OR irregularity affecting result	Dual *determinancia*: quantitative vote impact OR qualitative breach; < 5% margin shifts presumption	Pilot-province rule (PET Rule 65): protestant designates not more than three pilot provinces; protest may be dismissed without examining the rest	Substantive *Mandatsrelevanz*: electoral error must be capable of altering seat/mandate allocation
Treatment of wide-margin systemic illegality	Judicial praeter-legem waiver (penyimpangan Pasal 158) up to TOR = 49.05x (132/Tasikmalaya)	Explicit statutory qualitative prong (Raila Odinga v IEBC [2017] presidential annulment)	Qualitative *determinancia* annuls tainted elections even outside narrow arithmetic margins	Separate Quo Warranto / disqualification track divorced from arithmetic ballot-recount protests	Error without mandate impact is declared unlawful without annulling valid mandates
Screening of speculative count / fraud claims	Stage-1 *quod non* dismissal (227/310 cases) heavily reliant on Bawaslu PK reports	Short statutory timelines (a presidential petition is filed within 7 days and decided within 14 days; county-level petitions	Requirement of objective, material proof and of determinance, preventing generalized	Dismissal without examining the remaining provinces if the pilot-province showing is likely to fail	Summary rejection where alleged precinct defects cannot mathematically shift seats

Comparative dimension	Indonesia (Art. 158 Law 10/2016 & PMK 3/2024)	Kenya (Constitution Art. 140 & Elections Act s. 83)	Mexico (Constitution Art. 41-VI & TEPJF Doctrine)	Philippines (PET Rule 65 pilot-province rule)	Germany (Art. 41 GG & BVerfG Mandatsrelevanz)
		are decided within 6 months); burden of proof on the petitioner	patronage claims from voiding polls		
Dominant remedial proportionality	14 region-wide PSUs (11 with candidate disqualification) + 10 targeted TPS PSUs	Full repeat election upon systemic transmission/constitutional breach	Casilla-level nullity on statutory grounds vs election-level nullity where such grounds affect at least 20% of casillas (25% for the presidency) or for grave, intentional and determinative Article 41-VI breaches	Precinct-by-precinct recount adjustment rather than wholesale repeat voting	Partial repeat election: BVerfG 2 BvC 4/23 (2023) repeated only 455 / 2,256 Berlin districts
Transferable lesson for Indonesia	Baseline empirical problem: Art. 158 misclassified as standing rather than merits presumption	Re-codify Art. 158 into an explicit disjunctive quantitative/qualitative statutory standard	Adopt explicit statutory TSM burden rules & distinguish quantitative vs qualitative determinacy	Adopt a pilot-TPS pleading schedule in PMK, modeled on the Philippine pilot-province rule, to filter speculative C4 count claims	Lock candidate eligibility pre-election so post-election PSU remains surgically localized

Kenya's Elections Act 2011 contains Section 83[51]. Under it, no election is declared void for non-compliance with any written law relating to that election if it appears that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Constitution and in that written law, or that the non-compliance did not affect the result of the election. In Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) [2017], the Supreme Court of Kenya read Section 83 disjunctively. A petitioner succeeds by proving a quantitative effect on the numerical result, or by proving qualitative non-compliance with the constitutional electoral principles in Articles 81 and 86[52,53]. Kenya therefore writes into statute what Indonesia's Constitutional Court has had to devise *praeter legem* by "waiving" Article 158. The Kenyan approach also avoids the doctrinal anomaly of labelling a merits threshold a "standing" rule.

In Mexico, the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (*Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación*, TEPJF) developed two doctrines: *determinancia cuantitativa* (arithmetic impact on the winner) and *determinancia cualitativa* (substantial violation of constitutional fairness principles). The 2014 constitutional amendment to Article 41 Base VI of the Mexican Constitution reinforced them. It sets an explicit rebuttable presumption of outcome-determinative nullity for severe constitutional breaches (campaign spending above the legal cap by 5%, purchase of radio or television coverage, or the receipt or use of illicit or public funds) when the vote margin between first and second place is less than 5.0%[54–57]. This framework helps explain why uncorroborated TSM vote-buying claims fail (0/24) in Indonesia. Like the TEPJF, Indonesia's Constitutional Court declines to presume qualitative determinacy from isolated patronage anecdotes, unless systemic institutional capture is objectively documented.

The Philippines offers a third comparison. Automated optical-scan counting (COMELEC) there produced waves of speculative post-election protests alleging electronic/manual discrepancies, much like the Sirekap challenges in Indonesia (265/Jawa Timur). Rule 65 of the 2010 Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules allows the Tribunal to require the protestant to designate not more than three pilot provinces that best exemplify the alleged frauds or irregularities. The protest may be dismissed without considering the remaining provinces if the protestant will most probably fail to make out the case[58,59]. Philippine electoral law also moves candidate disqualification (quo warranto eligibility challenges) onto an independent legal track. That track is never subject to vote-margin recount thresholds. The contrast exposes a structural flaw in Indonesia's Pilkada Law, which sends Article 7(2) nomination defects through an Article 158 vote-count standing gate.

In Germany, electoral scrutiny (*Wahlprüfung*) under Article 41 of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*)[60] is first a matter for the Bundestag, with a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*, BVerfG) against its decision. The BVerfG applies the doctrine of mandate relevance (*Mandatsrelevanz*) and the requirement of least possible interference (*Gebot des geringstmöglichen Eingriffs*). This parallels broader European constitutional court standards on election annulment[61]. In its judgment of 19 December 2023 (2 BvC 4/23)[62], which reviewed the disorderly 2021 Berlin federal election, the BVerfG ordered a partial repeat election (*teilweise Wahlwiederholung*), confined to the 455 of 2,256 Berlin voting districts where election errors, such as missing or wrong ballot papers, closures, or long queues, were found to be mandate-relevant. This targeted proportionality resembles Indonesia's Track-A targeted TPS revotes (30/Magetan across 4 TPS). It also shows how wasteful Indonesia's eleven region-wide repeat elections were (Tasikmalaya, Gorontalo Utara, Pasaman, Pesawaran, Bengkulu Selatan, Parigi Moutong, Palopo, Kutai Kartanegara, Boven Digoel, Papua, and Mahakam Ulu). Each one was needed only because upstream administrative bodies did not enforce clear candidate-eligibility rules before election day.



Figure 4. Comparative synthesis of quantitative and qualitative electoral gatekeeping standards in Kenya, Mexico, the Philippines, and Germany (top row) and the resulting three-horizon *de lege ferenda* institutional and statutory reform pipeline for Indonesia anchored in Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025 (bottom row); the comparative rules are as stated in Table 9.

4.3 Sequenced de lege ferenda reform roadmap

Our empirical and comparative findings bear on institutional design as Indonesia approaches its planned omnibus election-law codification. Of the 24 PSU mandates in 2025, 14 (58.33%) required entire regencies, cities, or provinces to return to the polls, and 11 of those (45.83% of all 24) followed a candidate disqualification. The 24 PSU and 2 repeat elections were budgeted at about Rp719.1 billion nationwide, which regional budgets (APBD) could cover only in part[63]. Voters and polling officers were not at fault on election day. KPU and Bawaslu had allowed constitutionally ineligible candidates onto the ballot: two-term incumbents, undisclosed or uncooled ex-convicts, and holders of unverified equivalency diplomas. Table 10 sets out a sequenced three-horizon *de lege ferenda* reform matrix, anchored in Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025.

Table 10. Sequenced *de lege ferenda* institutional and statutory reform matrix anchored in empirical 2025 PHPU Kada findings and MK Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025.

Reform horizon & target instrument	Specific empirical pathology in 2025 corpus	Concrete legal & institutional reform design	Comparative / constitutional anchor	Projected system impact
Horizon 1 (Immediate Administrative): Joint PKPU & Perbawaslu Implementing Rules for MK Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025	KPU/PPK ignored Bawaslu PSU recommendations (30/Magetan, Bukti PK.16.20-11) & cleared two-term/convict candidates (132/Tasikmalaya, 55/Gorut)	1. Binding Pre-Certification Compliance Lock: Operationalize Bawaslu administrative outputs as self-executing *putusan* mandatory within 3 days. 2. Inter-Agency Eligibility Verification: Mandatory automated cross-check of Supreme Court SIAP criminal dockets (*Putusan* Kasasi/PK), Kemendagri acting-tenure decrees (*menjalankan tugas*), and PDDIKTI/Dapodik diploma registries prior to ballot printing.	MK Decisions No. 2/PUU-XXI/2023, 129/PUU-XXII/2024, & 104/PUU-XXIII/2025	Expected to reduce post-election candidate disqualifications and region-wide revote costs (a projected effect, not estimated in this study).
Horizon 2 (Short-Term Judicial): Amendment to Constitutional Court Regulation (PMK) No. 3 of 2024	227 Stage-1 dismissals averaging 212 pages; speculative C4 count claims & C3 anecdotes obscuring genuine Track-B defects	1. Dual-Track Pleading Schedule: Separate Form Track-A (arithmetic count disputes, requiring a pilot-TPS C.Hasil discrepancy table modeled on the Philippine pilot-province rule) from Form Track-B (qualitative constitutional override, requiring attached Bawaslu *putusan* or state eligibility decrees). 2. Pre-RPH Supervisory Ledger: Standardized digital Bawaslu-KPU compliance matrix filed before Stage-1 deliberation.	Philippines PET Rule 65 (pilot-province rule); PMK No. 3/2024 Arts. 6, 37 and 48	Slashes speculative Stage-1 filing volume and concentrates scarce 45-day plenary trial time on meritorious Track-A/Track-B disputes.
Horizon 3 (Medium-Term Legislative): Omnibus Amendment to Law No. 10 of 2016 (UU Pilkada / Kodifikasi UU Pemilu)	Textual fiction of Art. 158 as an absolute legal standing bar (TOR ≤ 2%) clashing with praeter-legem waivers up to TOR = 49.05x; single-ticket ballot negation (05/Banjarbaru)	1. Reclassify Art. 158 from Standing to a Rebuttable Quantitative Presumption: Replace absolute standing bar with an explicit disjunctive two-prong statutory standard (quantitative margin compliance OR qualitative constitutional defect). 2. Pre-Ballot Finality for Art. 7(2) Candidacy: Vest final expedited 14-day pre-ballot candidacy review in Bawaslu + MK/MA	Kenya Elections Act s. 83; Mexico Art. 41-VI; Germany *Mandatsrelevanz*; MK Decision No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015	Aligns statutory text with constitutional practice, ends praeter-legem uncertainty, and protects plebiscite integrity in single-candidate races.

Reform horizon & target instrument	Specific empirical pathology in 2025 corpus	Concrete legal & institutional reform design	Comparative / constitutional anchor	Projected system impact
		before ballots print. 3. Blank-Column Protection (Art. 54C): Mandate automatic conversion of late-disqualified rival columns into valid *kolom kosong* plebiscite tallying.		

4.4 Limitations

Four methodological limitations bound our inferences and point to directions for future research. First, Stratum II covers 100.0% of all 40 Stage-2 evidentiary-trial judgments nationwide. Stratum I (n_1 = 48 full-text PDFs across 16 provinces) instead reflects what the open-access JDIH Bawaslu repository makes available, and it is not a simple random draw from all 233 Stage-1 *Putusan*. Model 3 absorbs cross-stratum selection through a stratum fixed effect, and Sensitivity Check S7 calibrates predicted probabilities to the national *Putusan* base rate (τ = 26/273 = 9.52%). Even so, the prior correction assumes that sampling depended on the outcome, whereas the 82 judgments were selected by stage and repository availability, so the national probabilities are illustrative. Full-text optical parsing of all Stage-1 dismissals, once they are archived in unified open formats, would further refine the continuous TOR quantiles. Second, upstream claim coding relies on party pleadings and on written Bawaslu reports summarized in the judgment text. It does not draw on raw video exhibits or on live witness demeanour during Stage-2 hearings. Third, our analysis centers on the 2024–2025 nationwide simultaneous Pilkada cycle. Multi-cycle panel comparisons linking the 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2025 dockets would open a promising path for longitudinal jurimetrics. Fourth, future socio-legal fieldwork should track fiscal execution and voter-turnout decay across all 24 regions that held court-ordered PSUs in 2025.

5. Conclusion

Article 158 of Law No. 10 of 2016 is not a dead letter, and it is not a mechanical arithmetic guillotine either. In Indonesia's 2025 simultaneous regional election disputes, the Constitutional Court applied the statutory 0.5%–2.0% vote-margin rule as an institutional triage filter in which corroborated eligibility and supervisory defects mattered more than margin proximity. The data cover eighty-two non-overlapping judgments across seventy-four contests and twenty-eight provinces. Defeated candidates often challenged margins more than tenfold above the statutory cap (median TOR = 10.403x). Enforcement of the threshold followed institutional corroboration, not closeness to the margin. The Court barred an uncorroborated petition only 230 votes above the cap in Kolaka Utara (TOR = 1.139x). It waived a 230,011-vote deficit (TOR = 49.053x) in Tasikmalaya so that constitutional two-term limits could be enforced. In the complete national census of forty Stage-2 plenary trials, twenty-six petitions (65.0%) won constitutional relief, and relief was strongly associated with two distinct pathways. The first was a defect in statutory candidate eligibility under Article 7(2) (Model 3 OR = 14.32; Model 2B disqualification OR = 101.64), which drove ten of the nation's eleven candidate disqualifications. The second was upstream Bawaslu supervisory corroboration (Model 3 OR = 519.68), which accompanied all ten targeted polling-station revotes and was associated with a deliberative judicial reasoning share 8.59 percentage points higher. Standalone uncorroborated vote-buying allegations failed in every instance (0/24; OR = 0.04). Three reforms could help reconcile speedy local executive transitions with substantive constitutional democracy: operationalizing Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXIII/2025 so that candidate eligibility is fixed before ballot printing, adopting a pilot-precinct pleading rule in PMK No. 3 of 2024, modeled on the pilot-province approach of Philippine PET Rule 65, and recodifying Article 158 as a disjunctive quantitative–qualitative statutory standard.

Declarations

Ethics Approval and Consent

Not applicable. The study analyzed public judicial decisions and statutory instruments, which are excluded from copyright protection under Article 42(d) of Law No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright, and involved no human subjects or private personal data.

Use of Artificial Intelligence

The authors declare that no generative artificial intelligence tools were used in the design, analysis, or writing of this manuscript.

Author Contributions

I.Sh.: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Formal analysis, Investigation, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Visualization. I.Su.: Validation, Resources, Writing – review & editing. S.S.: Validation, Supervision, Project administration, Writing – review & editing. All authors have read and approved the final published version of the manuscript.

Funding

None. This research received no external funding from any public, commercial, or not-for-profit agency.

Competing Interests

None. The authors declare no competing interests.

Data Availability Statement

The de-identified dataset and the analysis scripts supporting the findings are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Acknowledgments

None.

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