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Agenda Control as a Veto Point: An Empirical Legal Analysis of Legislative Scheduling Discretion in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Digital publics are credited with forcing Indonesia's Sexual Violence Crimes Law onto the statute book in 2022, yet mobilisation against bills has failed to slow them and mobilisation for bills has failed to start them. This study asks where in the constitutional sequence public pressure ceases to determine outcomes, testing whether scheduling discretion under Law No. 12 of 2011 operates as an unregulated veto point. Three evidence layers are combined: two source-verified event chronologies (136 events, 2014–2026; blind re-coding of 30 events, Cohen's $\kappa = 0.952$) tested by permutation; direct measurement of intervals between the constitutional stages each bill traverses; and Kaplan–Meier survival analysis of eleven contested bills, one right-censored. Legislative steps followed mobilisation at a median of 20 days in one paired case against a randomisation expectation of 113.5 ($p < 0.0001$), but at 568.5 days in the other ($p = 0.91$). Executive responsiveness was near-identical at 24 and 25 days, within the 60-day limit of Article 49(1); the ensuing parliamentary interval, bound by no statutory deadline whatever, ranged from 6 to 1,102 days. Bills opposed by mobilised publics were enacted at a median of 111 days and bills demanded by them at 1,036 days, a contrast directionally consistent across four pre-specified specifications, two of which reach significance, but inferentially fragile at $n = 11$. Three long-demanded bills never entered joint deliberation. Comparison with Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States identifies transplantable remedies, and three *de lege ferenda* reforms are drafted.

1. Introduction

On 12 April 2022 the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia passed the Sexual Violence Crimes Bill after roughly eight years of advocacy, and the statute was promulgated as Law No. 12 of 2022. The passage was widely attributed to digital publics: hashtag campaigns, viral victim testimony, online petitions, and the national outrage that followed particular cases.^{1–3} Four years later, on Kartini Day 2026, the same chamber passed the Domestic Workers Protection Bill after twenty-two years. Both were victim-protection statutes promoted by overlapping coalitions; both attracted sustained

mobilisation; both eventually became law. The difference in tempo is nearly threefold in years, and it is not explained by the strength of the public case for either.

A harder anomaly sits alongside these two. In September 2019, at the height of the largest student mobilisation since 1998 — protests explicitly demanding that it be abandoned — the amendment weakening the Corruption Eradication Commission was deliberated and passed in six days and promulgated as Law No. 19 of 2019.^{4,5} In November 2025 the new Criminal Procedure Code was enacted over sustained civil-society opposition. Meanwhile the asset-forfeiture bill, demanded by anti-corruption

movements for seventeen years and formally transmitted to parliament by presidential letter in May 2023, had still not been the subject of a single joint working meeting by July 2026. Taken together these cases embarrass the simple proposition that networked outrage moves legislation. Mobilisation against bills has repeatedly failed to stop or even slow them; mobilisation for bills has repeatedly failed to start them.

This article therefore reframes the question. Rather than asking whether digital pressure ‘works’, it asks where in the legislative chain pressure ceases to be decisive, and tests a specific institutional and doctrinal answer: that the scheduling discretion held by parliamentary leadership constitutes a veto point which neither public attention nor executive backing can override. The theoretical vocabulary for such a constraint is well established. Comparative legislative research establishes that the power to decide what reaches the agenda is distinct from the power to decide outcomes, and that it is exercised through the internal rules of procedure rather than through voting;^{6,7} that majority leadership uses it to keep off the floor measures it could not defeat on it;⁸ and that changes to those rules measurably alter the fate of bills.^{9,10} What has not been done is to locate that constraint in a specific legal provision and to measure its consequences in days.

The Indonesian legal architecture makes such a measurement unusually clean. Article 20(1) of the 1945 Constitution vests the power to form statutes in the House of Representatives, Article 21 confers the right of initiative on members, and Article 22A remits the procedure to ordinary legislation. Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislation, as amended by Law No. 15 of 2019 and Law No. 13 of 2022, duly regulates planning, initiative, the presidential letter and two-level deliberation. Article 49(1) binds the President to appoint negotiating ministers within 60 days. No provision anywhere in the sequence binds the House to begin deliberating within any period at all. The Constitutional Court has developed this area in one direction only: Decision No. 27/PUU-VII/2009 established that the law-making process is justiciable, and Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 held the Job

Creation Law conditionally unconstitutional for defects of form while requiring meaningful public participation. Both decisions regulate how a bill is made; neither reaches the question whether it is deliberated at all.^{11–13}

The contribution this makes to Indonesian legal scholarship should be stated precisely, because the literature on the law-making process is already substantial. That literature is almost entirely concerned with the quality of legislation once made — its drafting, its participation credentials, its constitutionality.^{14,15} The scholarship following the Job Creation decision is representative: it asks whether those affected were heard during deliberation, and has nothing to say about a constituency whose bill is never deliberated at all.^{16,17} This article identifies a category of legal phenomenon that the doctrinal vocabulary has not named — the bill possessing full formal legal life and no access to the calendar — and measures its incidence. A second aspect of the contribution runs against the grain of a decade of scholarship on executive dominance in Indonesian lawmaking;^{3,11} on this measurement the executive is the branch that performs punctually within its statutory limit, and the representative branch is the one that does not.

Three hypotheses follow. H1 (conditional responsiveness): where mobilisation is dense and recurrent, formal legislative steps will cluster temporally after it; where it is sparse, they will not. H1 is deliberately framed as a conditional rather than a general proposition, because a single confirming case would not establish a general tendency and a single disconfirming case would refute one. H2 (branch symmetry): if the executive were the constraint, bills should diverge at the stage where responsibility sits with the President; if parliament is the constraint, they should diverge only afterwards. H3 (direction irrelevance): if agenda control rather than public opinion governs tempo, the direction of mobilisation — for or against a bill — should not predict speed, and may even run counter to it. The observable implication is precise and falsifiable: we should be able to find bills commanding majority support, executive backing and documented public demand that nevertheless do not

move, and we should observe them move rapidly once — and only once — scheduling is granted.

The article makes three contributions. First, it supplies the first systematic measurement of how long Indonesian bills wait at each stage of the constitutional sequence, distinguishing the executive from the parliamentary segment. Second, it identifies the legal source of the resulting delay as a statutory silence in Law No. 12 of 2011 and Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020 rather than a command of the Constitution — a finding that determines where the remedy must lie. Third, it converts that finding into three drafted, institutionally addressed *de lege ferenda* proposals, assessed for transplantability against German, British and American functional equivalents.^{6,18,19}

The aim of this study is therefore twofold: to locate, by direct measurement, the precise stage of the Indonesian constitutional sequence at which public and digital mobilisation ceases to determine legislative outcomes; and to convert that finding into feasible, constitutionally grounded reform of the instruments that govern legislative scheduling. The novelty of the study lies in three respects. It is the first to measure the duration of every constitutional stage an Indonesian bill must traverse and to separate the executive from the parliamentary segment of that wait. It is the first to identify the binding constraint on responsive lawmaking as an unregulated scheduling discretion — a statutory silence in Law No. 12 of 2011 and Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020 rather than a command of the Constitution. And it is the first to name and empirically document a distinct category of legal phenomenon, the bill possessing full formal legal life yet no access to the legislative calendar, which neither implementation studies nor roll-call analysis are equipped to detect.

2. Methods

Research type and design

This study employs empirical legal research within a socio-legal frame, combined with a normative analysis of the governing instruments. The empirical component is appropriate because the question is not what the law provides — the provisions are short and

unambiguous — but what follows from what it omits, which can only be established by measurement. The normative component is necessary because the measured behaviour is lawful: no rule is breached when a bill is never scheduled, and the critique is therefore internal and structural rather than one of illegality.

Neither component is sufficient alone, and the dependence is worth stating. A doctrinal analysis by itself would establish only that the statute contains a gap, which is unremarkable and could be dismissed as a drafting choice; an empirical analysis by itself would establish only that bills are slow, which every practitioner already knows. It is the conjunction — a specific statutory silence whose consequences are measured in days — that carries the argument. The reframing of the research question should also be defended rather than presented as a natural narrowing. The question the literature usually asks, whether mobilisation causes legislative outcomes, is not answerable by any design available here; the question asked instead, where in the sequence pressure ceases to be decisive, is answerable by direct measurement. That is a narrower and an easier question, and it is chosen because it is tractable.

The three layers are convergent but they are not of equal evidentiary weight, and readers should calibrate accordingly. The procedural-interval layer is the strongest: it is a within-design comparison in which the constitutional sequence, the institutional setting and the direction of mobilisation are held constant while only the branch responsible varies, and the resulting contrast requires no statistical test to interpret. The event-level layer is intermediate: it establishes temporal association within cases but cannot distinguish responsiveness from common causation. The bill-level layer is the weakest, for the reasons of sample size set out in §3.4 and §4.7, and it is offered as corroboration rather than as independent proof.

The design is nested. The two victim-protection bills provide a most-similar paired comparison in which the direction of mobilisation is held constant — both were demanded — while tempo varies, permitting fine-grained event-level tracing. The eleven-bill

survival dataset supplies the cross-case variation that paired comparison lacks, and in particular the bills where mobilisation ran against enactment, which are the critical test of H3. The procedural interval measurement links the two layers, because every bill must traverse the same constitutional sequence, which makes the executive and parliamentary segments directly comparable across cases.

Legal research approach

The normative analysis proceeds through four interpretive layers applied to the provisions governing legislative timing. Grammatical interpretation reads the statutory text literally: Article 49(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 imposes a 60-day limit on the President, and Articles 65–68 describe two-level deliberation without stating when level one must begin. Systematic interpretation reads those provisions against Article 1(3), Article 28C(2) and Article 28D(1) of the Constitution and against the participation regime inserted by Law No. 13 of 2022, revealing a guarantee that operates only after the discretionary gateway has been passed. Teleological interpretation measures the provisions against the stated purpose of the 2011 statute — order, planning and predictability in law-making — against which indefinite dormancy is a defect in the realisation of the instrument's own object. Historical interpretation traces the three iterations of the statute and establishes that the legislature has repeatedly regulated how bills are made while consistently declining to regulate when. *De lege lata* analysis states the law as it stands; *de lege ferenda* analysis proposes reform, drafted to the specific instrument that contains the defect.

Sources of legal materials

Primary legal materials comprise the 1945 Constitution (Arts. 1(3), 5(1), 20, 20A, 21, 22A, 28C(2), 28D(1)); Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislation as amended by Law No. 15 of 2019 and Law No. 13 of 2022; Law No. 17 of 2014 on the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD as amended; Regulations of the House No. 1 of 2020 (order of business) and No. 2 of 2020 (formation of statutes); the statutes constituting the eleven-bill dataset; and Constitutional Court Decisions Nos. 27/PUU-VII/2009, 91/PUU-

XVIII/2020 and 70 and 79/PUU-XVII/2019. Comparative materials comprise § 62(2) of the Standing Orders of the German Bundestag, Rule XV cl. 2 of the Rules of the United States House of Representatives, and the Standing Orders of the United Kingdom House of Commons governing backbench and petitions business. International materials comprise ILO Convention No. 189 and Articles 2(2) and 25(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Secondary materials comprise the scholarship cited throughout. The foreign standing orders are living instruments amended frequently; each was consulted in the version in force at 18 July 2026 and is cited to that version.

Comparator jurisdictions were selected on two stated criteria: the presence of an identifiable rule by which consideration of a measure can be compelled against the wishes of those controlling the agenda, and diversity of legal tradition, so that the comparison is not confined to a single family of procedural design.^{20–22} Germany supplies a civil-law parliamentary system with a minority right; the United Kingdom a common-law parliamentary system with a public trigger; the United States a presidential system with a majority override. No regional comparator is included, and this is a limitation rather than a design preference: the Philippines and Thailand both operate legislatures with identifiable agenda-setting rules, and a comparison including them would be more immediately persuasive to a Southeast Asian readership.

Event chronologies and coding

Two chronologies were constructed with an identical protocol: 95 events for the sexual-violence bill (1 July 2014 – 31 December 2022) and 41 for the domestic-workers bill (1 January 2014 – 18 July 2026). Sources were national news organisations of record, specialist legal and gender outlets, and official sources including the House of Representatives, the National Commission on Violence Against Women, the Manpower Ministry, the Presidential Staff Office and the State Secretariat. Every event carries a source URL in the published dataset; unverifiable events were excluded. Two consequences follow from that rule, and

both run against the author's interest. The sexual-violence chronology begins in 2014 rather than the commonly repeated 2012, for which no primary source could be found; and no series of hashtag volumes, search interest or petition trajectories is used, because none could be retrieved in verifiable form.

Events were coded into five mutually exclusive types — formal legislative step (LEG), digital or public mobilisation (DIG), trigger case (TRG), organised counter-mobilisation or deliberate delay (OPP), and executive response outside parliament (GOV) — using a written codebook with explicit disambiguation rules, reproduced in the supplementary materials, following current guidance on codebook construction for categorical coding.^{23,24}

Inter-coder reliability

To address the single-coder problem, a random sample of 30 events (22% of the corpus) was re-coded by a second coder working blind to the original codes and with access only to the codebook, the actor and the event description. Agreement was 96.7% with Cohen's $\kappa = 0.952$ (95% CI 0.86–1.00), which falls in the 'almost perfect' range under the conventional benchmarks for chance-corrected agreement.^{23,24} The single disagreement is substantively instructive and is reported rather than reconciled: a press release by the National Commission on Violence Against Women urging ratification and passage was coded GOV by the first coder, because the Commission is a state body, and DIG by the second, because the act was advocacy. Indonesian national human-rights commissions genuinely occupy this hybrid position, and the ambiguity is a property of the institution rather than of the instrument.

Measures and inference

Event-level coupling was measured as the lag from each legislative step back to the nearest preceding pressure event, where pressure events are those coded DIG or TRG; legislative events are excluded from the pressure set to avoid circularity. Significance was assessed by permutation with 20,000 replications per case, redrawing legislative dates at random across each case's observation window while holding pressure dates fixed, with the add-one correction.

Procedural intervals were measured directly between the defined stages of the constitutional sequence: parliamentary initiative approval, the presidential letter appointing negotiators, submission of the government's list of issues, first-level approval, and plenary passage. These are the points at which responsibility shifts between branches, which is what makes them diagnostic for H2.

The bill-level dataset comprises eleven contested bills deliberated between 2015 and 2026, each anchored at the earliest verifiable start of joint deliberation — the presidential letter, or the first joint working meeting where no new letter was issued after a carry-over. Duration runs to plenary passage, or is right-censored at 18 July 2026 for the asset-forfeiture bill, which has never entered joint deliberation. Mobilisation direction was coded AGAINST, FOR, MIXED or LOW from documented protest evidence. Analysis used Kaplan–Meier estimation and the log-rank test,²⁵ with two pre-specified sensitivity analyses addressing the one bill whose anchoring is genuinely contestable — the Criminal Code, transmitted by presidential letter in 2015 but dormant until deliberation resumed in June 2020 — plus an exact permutation test on the median difference. Three further bills that have never reached joint deliberation are reported separately, since no duration can be computed for them.

Two features of this layer require explicit statement. First, the sampling frame is purposive rather than exhaustive: the eleven bills are those deliberated in the period for which contestation is documented in the sources described above, and bills that were slow but uncontroversial are excluded by construction. The comparison between the two mobilisation directions is therefore internally valid, but the medians should not be read as estimates of legislative tempo generally. Second, mobilisation direction is coded partly from protest occurring during deliberation, which is to say after the scheduling decision the study seeks to explain; for bills opposed after being scheduled, the opposition is in part a response to the scheduling. This does not affect the interpretation offered here, which is that direction fails to predict speed rather than that direction causes it,

but it precludes reading the AGAINST median as evidence that opposition accelerates legislation.

The power of the log-rank test at these group sizes is very low. With seven and four observations the test could not have detected an effect of the size plausibly at issue, and a non-significant result is therefore uninformative rather than disconfirming.

Ethics

The study analyses publicly reported events and published documents and involved no human subjects. Victims are identified only as they were already identified in the public record, and pseudonyms used by the press are retained.

3. Results

The constitutional and statutory foundation

The provisions governing legislative timing are set out in Table 1, which reports each stage of the sequence, the instrument that governs it, the actor responsible and the statutory time limit, if any. The pattern is unambiguous. Of the eight stages through which an Indonesian bill passes, the only two that carry a deadline both bind the President: Article 49(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 requires him to appoint negotiating ministers within 60 days, and Article 73 imposes a deadline for promulgation. Every stage allocated to the House — initiative endorsement, scheduling of joint deliberation, first-level approval, plenary passage — is unregulated as to time.

Table 1. The Indonesian legislative framework: stages, governing provisions and temporal regulation.

Stage	Governing provision	Actor	Statutory time limit	Status
<i>Prolegnas</i> listing	UU No. 12/2011 Arts. 16–23	DPR (<i>Badan Legislatif</i>) with Government and DPD	None	Annual priority list; listing creates no duty to deliberate
Initiative endorsement	UUD 1945 Art. 21; UU No. 17/2014 Art. 71; Peraturan DPR No. 2/2020	DPR plenary	None	Gateway; several bills have never passed it
Presidential letter appointing negotiators	UU No. 12/2011 Art. 49(1)	President	60 days from receipt of the bill	The only binding deadline in the entire sequence
Government list of issues (DIM)	Peraturan DPR No. 2/2020	Government ministries	None stated	Completed in 30 days in the domestic-workers case, then unexamined for 504 days
Scheduling of joint deliberation	UU No. 17/2014; Peraturan DPR No. 1/2020	<i>Badan Musyawarah</i> / commission leadership	None	Unregulated: no deadline, criteria, reason-giving duty or discharge route
First-level approval (Tingkat I)	UU No. 12/2011 Arts. 65–68	Commission and Government	None	Reached within days once scheduling is granted
Plenary passage (Tingkat II)	UUD 1945 Art. 20(2)–(4); UU No. 12/2011 Art. 69	DPR plenary and President	30 days for promulgation (Art. 73)	Deadline binds promulgation, not deliberation
Carry-over between parliamentary terms	UU No. 12/2011 Art. 71A (inserted by UU No. 15/2019)	DPR	None	Preserves a bill's formal life indefinitely; attaches no duty to resume

Note: Compiled from the instruments cited. The sequence contains one deadline binding the executive and none binding the legislature at any stage between initiative endorsement and plenary passage.

Grammatically, the text says what it says: a duty is imposed on the executive and none on the legislature. Systematically, that reading sits uneasily with Article 1(3), Article 28C(2) and Article 28D(1) of the Constitution, and still more uneasily with the participation regime inserted by Law No. 13 of 2022, under which the House must receive, consider and answer public submissions on a bill under deliberation while remaining free never to deliberate

the bill at all. Teleologically, the 2011 statute was enacted to impose planning and predictability on law-making, and the *Prolegnas* exists to convert political priority into a programmed timetable; a mechanism under which a bill may be listed as a priority, endorsed as an initiative, receive a presidential letter and a completed government position and then wait 504 days with that position still unexamined defeats the object of the 2011 statute itself. That purpose is drawn

from the *considerans* of the statute and from its academic draft (*naskah akademik*), which records disorder and unpredictability in law-making as the mischief the instrument was enacted to remedy. Historically, the direction of travel confirms the reading: the 2019 amendment added carry-over, which lowered the cost of dormancy by preserving a bill's formal life across a change of parliament, and the 2022 amendment strengthened participation. Across three iterations the legislature has regulated drafting, consolidation and consultation, and has at no point regulated when deliberation must begin. Two qualifications complete the interpretive picture. The four layers are not four independent tests: the

systematic, teleological and historical readings all take as their object the same silence identified grammatically, so their convergence is corroborative rather than cumulative, and the historical layer alone was capable of disconfirming the grammatical reading — by revealing a deliberate and reasoned decision to leave timing unregulated — and revealed no such decision. And because the four layers converge, no view need be taken on the contested question whether the grammatical layer enjoys primacy in Indonesian legal hermeneutics; nothing in the argument turns on that hierarchy. Table 2 sets out the analysis of each primary source and the gap it exposes.

Table 2. Analysis of primary legal sources on the regulation of legislative timing.

Instrument or decision	Provision or ruling	Principle established	Analysis	Gap exposed
UUD NRI 1945	Arts. 20(1), 21, 22A	Legislative power and the right of initiative vest in the DPR; procedure is remitted to statute	The Constitution confers competence without attaching any temporal duty to its exercise	Silence is constitutional, not unconstitutional — the remedy must therefore be legislative
UU No. 12 Tahun 2011	Art. 49(1)	The President must appoint negotiating ministers within 60 days	Measured executive intervals of 24 and 25 days show the bound branch performing well inside its limit	No provision imposes a corresponding limit on the DPR at any stage
UU No. 15 Tahun 2019	Art. 71A (carry-over)	Unfinished bills survive a change of parliamentary term	Lowers the cost of dormancy: a bill retains formal life without any duty to resume	Converts delay from a procedural cost into a costless default
UU No. 13 Tahun 2022	Arts. 96, 96A	Public views must be received, considered and answered	Strengthens participation in bills under deliberation	Attaches no obligation to the antecedent decision whether to deliberate at all
UU No. 17 Tahun 2014	Arts. 71, 164–170	The <i>Badan Musyawarah</i> determines the order of business	Confers scheduling power without stating any criterion for its exercise	The operative discretion is conferred but not conditioned
Peraturan DPR RI No. 1 Tahun 2020	Tata Tertib (order of business)	Internal allocation of sitting time	The proximate legal source of the discretion measured in this study	No deadline, no published reasons, no member-initiated route to compel tabling
Putusan MK No. 27/PUU-VII/2009	Formal review jurisdiction	The law-making process is justiciable	Establishes that procedure is reviewable in principle	Review presupposes an enacted norm; inaction produces none
Putusan MK No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020	Conditional unconstitutionality; meaningful participation	Public participation is a condition of validity of the process	The leading authority on how bills must be made	Says nothing about when, or whether, a bill must be deliberated
Putusan MK Nos. 70 and 79/PUU-XVII/2019	Review of the KPK amendment	Enactment in six days did not invalidate the statute	Confirms that speed alone does not vitiate process	Neither haste nor indefinite delay attracts an effective remedy

Note: Instruments are analysed as they stand at 18 July 2026. Statutory interpretation proceeded grammatically, systematically, teleologically and historically; the grammatical reading is decisive and the remaining layers confirm rather than displace it.

One point of location should be made precise before the empirical layers are reported. The scheduling power is conferred by the provisions of Law No. 17 of 2014 and of Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020 that constitute the *Badan Musyawarah* and allocate the order of business to it. Those provisions state the

composition of the body and the scope of its authority; they state no criterion by which that authority is to be exercised, no period within which it must be exercised, and no consequence of its non-exercise. The discretion is therefore not merely broad but unconditioned, and it is this quality — not the existence of the power,

which every legislature confers on some organ^{6,7}— that the remainder of this article examines. The discretion is also distributed rather than concentrated: commission leadership, the *Badan Legislasi* and the steering body each hold a point at which a bill can be arrested, and *fraksi* leadership operates behind all three. That distribution has direct consequences for reform design, considered in §4.5.

Event-level coupling (H1)

The two paired cases diverge sharply, as detailed in Table 3. For the sexual-violence bill the median lag from a legislative step back to the nearest preceding pressure event was a median of 20 days against a randomisation expectation of 113.5 days, and 60.6% of steps fell within 30 days of a pressure event against

24.3% expected; both are extreme under the null ($p < 0.0001$), and the association survives a conservative within-phase permutation. For the domestic-workers bill the median lag was 568.5 days — longer, not shorter, than the expectation of 385.2 days ($p = 0.91$). A more granular measure detects a minority effect: 22.7% of its legislative steps fell within 30 days of mobilisation against 5.7% expected ($p = 0.007$), reflecting the two moments when mobilisation and parliamentary action did align. H1, framed as a conditional, is borne out: coupling appears where mobilisation is dense and recurrent and is absent where it is sparse. Framed as a general proposition about legislative responsiveness it would be false, since a single confirming case cannot establish a general tendency and the second case disconfirms one.

Table 3. Event-level coupling between mobilisation and legislative steps (20,000 permutations per case).

Statistic	Observed	Null expectation	p
Sexual violence — median lag	20 days	113.5 days	< 0.0001
Sexual violence — within 30 days	60.6%	24.3%	< 0.0001
Domestic workers — median lag	568.5 days	385.2 days	0.91 (n.s.)
Domestic workers — within 30 days	22.7%	5.7%	0.007

Note. Pressure events are those coded DIG or TRG; legislative events are excluded from the pressure set to avoid circularity. Reliability of the underlying coding: Cohen's $\kappa = 0.952$ on a blind re-coded random sample of 30 events.

Where the branches diverge (H2)

Both bills traversed the identical constitutional sequence, which permits a direct test of where they parted company. Executive responsiveness was effectively the same: the interval from parliamentary initiative approval to the presidential letter was 24 days for the sexual-violence bill (18 January to 11 February 2022) and 25 days for the domestic-workers bill on its first attempt (21 March to 15 April 2023) — in both cases well inside the 60 days allowed by Article 49(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011. In the latter case the government went further, completing its list of issues by 15 May 2023 and publicly targeting enactment within the year.

What followed diverged completely: 60 days to enactment in the first case, against 1,102 days in the second, during which the completed government position lay unexamined for 504 days and no formal step of any kind occurred for 534. When the 2024–

2029 parliament finally scheduled the matter, the bill was re-approved as an initiative on 12 March 2026, received a fresh presidential letter on 15 April — an executive interval of 34 days, the longest of the three measured and still well inside the statutory limit — then a 417-point list of issues and first-level approval on 20 April, and became law on 21 April: 40 days from re-initiation and six from the presidential letter. Measured end to end, the sexual-violence bill took 84 days from initiative endorsement to enactment and the domestic-workers bill 1,127 days on its first attempt against 40 on its second, while the longest single gap between two consecutive formal steps was 433 days in the first case and 534 in the second. The intervals are detailed in Table 4 and displayed on a logarithmic scale in Figure 1. H2 is supported: the divergence is located entirely after responsibility returns to parliament, and it is located precisely where the statute imposes no limit.

Table 4. Procedural intervals along the identical constitutional sequence.

Interval	Governing provision	Sexual violence (2022)	Domestic workers, 1st attempt	Domestic workers, 2nd attempt
Initiative → presidential letter (executive)	UU No. 12/2011 Art. 49(1) — 60-day limit	24 days	25 days	34 days
Presidential letter → passage (parliament)	UU No. 12/2011 Arts. 65–69 — no limit	60 days	1,102 days	6 days
Initiative → passage (total)	—	84 days	1,127 days	40 days
Longest gap between formal steps	—	433 days	534 days	—

Note: Both bills traversed the same constitutional sequence, which is what makes the segments comparable. The executive segment is bound by a statutory deadline and varied by one day between the two cases; the parliamentary segment is bound by none and varied by a factor of 184.




Figure 1. Executive and parliamentary segments of the path from initiative approval to enactment (log scale). The executive segment is bound by the 60-day limit in Article 49(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 and varied by one day across the two paired cases; the parliamentary segment is bound by no statutory limit and varied from 6 to 1,102 days.

Bill-level survival: does mobilisation direction predict speed? (H3)

Eleven contested bills deliberated between 2015 and 2026 were assembled with a common anchor. The descriptive contrast, detailed in Table 5 and displayed bill by bill in Figure 2, runs opposite to the naive expectation. Bills facing mobilisation against them were enacted at a median of 111 days from the start of joint deliberation ($n = 7$, range 6–2,741, none

censored); bills demanded by mobilised publics took a median of 1,036 days ($n = 4$, range 60–1,171, one right-censored). The single fastest enactment in the set is the 2019 amendment to the anti-corruption commission law: six days from presidential letter to plenary passage, during the largest student mobilisation in two decades demanding precisely the opposite outcome. The slowest observation is a bill demanded for seventeen years whose presidential letter has never produced a meeting.

Table 5. Time from the start of joint deliberation to enactment, by direction of mobilization.

Group	n	Median days	Interquartile range	Full range	Censored
Mobilisation AGAINST the bill	7	111	92.5–239.5	6–2,741	0
Mobilisation FOR the bill	4	1,036	742.5–1,119.3	60–1,171	1

Note: Each bill is anchored at the earliest verifiable start of joint deliberation — the presidential letter, or the first joint working meeting where no new letter issued after a carry-over. The single censored observation is the asset-forfeiture bill, censored at 18 July 2026. Because that observation is the largest in its group, the Kaplan–Meier estimate for the FOR group does not reach zero and the group median is computed from the uncensored observations.

Bills opposed by mobilised publics were enacted fastest




Figure 2. Time from the start of joint deliberation to enactment, by bill and direction of mobilisation (log scale). The fastest enactment in the set occurred against the densest opposition; the slowest observation is a bill demanded for seventeen years whose presidential letter has never produced a working meeting.

Inference at $n = 11$ must be reported with candour, and no favourable specification is selected. In the main specification the log-rank test does not reach significance ($\chi^2 = 0.97$, $p = 0.325$), because the Criminal Code enters with a 2,741-day duration anchored on a 2015 presidential letter that lay dormant for five years. Under the pre-specified alternative anchoring that bill at the resumption of active deliberation in June 2020, the difference is significant ($\chi^2 = 4.09$, $p = 0.043$); excluding the bill

entirely leaves it borderline ($\chi^2 = 3.80$, $p = 0.051$); and an exact permutation test on the median difference of 925 days yields $p = 0.088$. All four specifications are detailed in Table 6, and the Kaplan–Meier estimates are shown in Figure 3. The direction is consistent across every specification and the effect size is large, but the sample cannot sustain a confident inferential claim. H3 is therefore treated as supported descriptively and by the procedural and qualitative evidence, and not as established by hypothesis test.

Table 6. Robustness of the direction contrast across four pre-specified specifications

Specification	Test statistic	p
Main: all 11 bills, earliest verifiable anchor	$\chi^2(1) = 0.97$	0.325
Criminal Code anchored at resumption of deliberation (June 2020)	$\chi^2(1) = 4.09$	0.043
Criminal Code excluded ($n = 10$)	$\chi^2(1) = 3.80$	0.051
Exact permutation on the median difference (925 days)	—	0.088
Post hoc leave-one-out (each bill removed in turn)	$\chi^2(1) = 0.16\text{--}3.80$	0.051–0.688

Note: All specifications point the same way; none is nominated as preferred. The contrast is reported as descriptively large and inferentially fragile at $n = 11$. The leave-one-out row is reported post hoc and was not pre-specified; no single observation drives the result. All log-rank tests carry one degree of freedom.




Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier estimates by direction of mobilisation. Each curve steps downward as bills are enacted; the vertical mark denotes the single right-censored observation — a bill still not enacted at the close of observation, which is removed from the risk set without producing a step. The separation between the curves is large but does not reach significance in the main specification (Table 6).

Three further checks were conducted after the fact and are reported as post hoc rather than pre-specified. A leave-one-out analysis removing each bill in turn leaves the main specification non-significant in every case, with p ranging from 0.051 to 0.688; no single observation drives the result in either direction, and the only omission that approaches significance is that of the Criminal Code, which is the case already addressed by the second pre-specified specification. The interquartile ranges — 92.5 to 239.5 days for bills facing opposition and 742.5 to 1,119.3 days for bills demanded — show that the separation is not an artefact of the two extreme observations. And the contrast is unchanged on the logarithmic scale on which the durations are displayed in Figures 2 and 3, which is the appropriate scale for data of this skew. The consistent reading of all three checks is that the descriptive contrast is robust and the inferential claim remains unavailable at this sample size.

The bills that never began


The strongest evidence for agenda control lies outside the survival dataset, in bills for which no duration can be computed because joint deliberation never started. The asset-forfeiture bill, demanded

since 2008–2009 and central to anti-corruption mobilisation including the nationwide protests of August–September 2025, received a presidential letter on 4 May 2023; as of 18 July 2026 no joint working meeting had ever been convened, no working committee formed, and the government stated publicly that it was waiting for parliament to finish redrafting. The indigenous peoples bill has been before parliament for roughly sixteen years and, despite a drafting committee formed in January 2026 and a government draft handed over in February, has never been endorsed as a parliamentary initiative. The gender equality bill, opposed by religious organisations, never reached initiative status and is absent from the current priority programme.

In each case the executive has either acted or stands ready to act, majority support is not demonstrably absent, and public demand is documented; what is missing is scheduling. In the vocabulary of process tracing these cases operate as a hoop test: an account under which public demand plus executive willingness produces legislative movement must explain them, and cannot. The location of the constraint within the constitutional sequence is set out in Figure 4.

The constitutional sequence and the location of the binding constraint

Boxes: stages regulated by statute. Dashed arrow: the unregulated discretion that determines whether the sequence proceeds at all.



UUD NRI 1945 Art. 22A remits the procedure for making statutes to ordinary legislation. UU No. 12 Tahun 2011 regulates every stage of that procedure except the one that determines whether deliberation begins at all.

Figure 4. The constitutional sequence and the location of the binding constraint. Every stage is regulated by statute except the one that determines whether the sequence proceeds at all.

The comparative position

The comparison proceeds on the functional-equivalence method,^{20,21} which requires that the problem be specified before the solutions are compared. The *tertium comparationis* adopted here is the conversion of a demand for consideration into calendar time against the wishes of those who control the agenda. Institutions are treated as comparable if they perform that function, irrespective of their formal category — a standing-order provision, a chamber rule and a committee reporting duty are all admitted on that basis.

So specified, three jurisdictions solve the problem that Indonesian law leaves unsolved; the comparison across seven dimensions is detailed in Table 7. Germany's Bundestag requires a committee to report on a referred bill after ten sitting weeks on the demand of a parliamentary group or five per cent of members: a minority right, exercisable without majority cooperation. The United States permits an absolute majority to discharge a committee under Rule XV cl. 2, an override so demanding that it rarely succeeds — which is itself instructive about threshold design. The United Kingdom reserves days outside government control through the Backbench Business Committee and channels public petitions above a signature threshold into scheduled debate, the only comparator

that converts public mobilisation directly into calendar time.^{19,26} Indonesia provides no equivalent by any route: no deadline, no criteria, no duty to give reasons, and no mechanism by which any number of members or citizens can compel tabling.

Functional comparison also requires attention to the conditions outside the compared rule that make it work, since a provision transplanted without its supporting context may perform quite differently. The German reporting duty operates within a system in which committee chairmanships and speaking time are allocated proportionally among parliamentary groups,^{10,18} so a minority group possesses standing capacity to press a demand and an institutional interest in doing so; the ten-sitting-week period is calibrated to a predictable sitting calendar; and the duty produces a report rather than a vote, which limits its value as an obstruction device and correspondingly lowers resistance to its use. Two of these three conditions are reasonably well satisfied in Indonesia: the *fraksi* structure allocates committee positions proportionally, and the sitting calendar is published in advance. The third is weaker, since Indonesian practice has no established norm distinguishing a duty to report from a duty to decide. That difference is the principal risk in the transplant, and it shapes the drafting proposed in §4.5.

Table 7. Compelled scheduling in comparative perspective: functional equivalents to the Indonesian gap.

Dimension	Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Indonesia
Legal basis	Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages § 62(2)	Standing Orders (Backbench Business Committee; Petitions Committee, SO No. 152J)	Rules of the House, Rule XV cl. 2	UU No. 12/2011; UU No. 17/2014; Peraturan DPR No. 1/2020
Trigger	One parliamentary group or 5% of members	Committee allocation; petition signature threshold	Absolute majority signature	None available
Character of the threshold	Minority right	Institutional allocation with a public trigger	Majority override	—
Effect	Committee must report after ten sitting weeks	Days reserved outside government control; guaranteed debate	Committee discharged; floor consideration compelled	No effect obtainable by any route
Route for public mobilisation	Indirect, through a parliamentary group	Direct, through petitions above threshold	Indirect, through members	None
Duty to give reasons	Report required	Committee decisions published	Signatures public	None
Transplantability to Indonesia	High: a fraction-based trigger maps onto the <i>fraksi</i> structure and needs only an amendment to the standing orders	Medium: presupposes a government/backbench distinction absent from joint deliberation	Low: a majority threshold reproduces the coalition control that the data identify as the constraint	—

Note: Comparison conducted on the functional-equivalence method: the three foreign rules are compared not by form but by the problem they solve — converting a demand for consideration into calendar time against the wishes of those who control the agenda.

4. Discussion

What the three layers establish

One clarification of register precedes the discussion. Where this article describes scheduling discretion as the binding or operative constraint, the claim concerns the location of the variance — the stage of the constitutional sequence at which differences between bills arise — and not ultimate causation. The design is observational and identifies no counterfactual; it remains possible, that a prior political variable drives both the scheduling decision and the executive's speed, in which case agenda control is the mechanism through which that variable operates rather than an independent cause. Nothing that follows should be read as a claim of causal identification.

Read across the three layers, the evidence supports a more precise and less comfortable account than the one usually offered about digital publics. Where mobilisation is dense and recurrent it does track legislative activity closely: a median lag of 20 days where randomisation predicts more than a hundred is real responsiveness, and the sexual-violence case shows the focusing-event mechanism operating through digital amplification, the sequence by which networked attention is converted into institutional agenda status.^{1,2,27} The Yuyun case of April 2016 illustrates the sequence exactly — the crime occurred

on 2 April and became national news on 2 May when the hashtag campaign spread, the petition followed the next day, the presidential declaration eight days later, and the bill entered the priority programme within five weeks.

But that responsiveness is neither general nor decisive. The domestic-workers bill became law with no overall temporal association between mobilisation and parliamentary action. More tellingly, mobilisation against bills has repeatedly failed to slow them: the anti-corruption commission amendment passed in six days during mass protest, the Criminal Procedure Code in 243 days over organised opposition, the Job Creation Law in 236 days amid national strikes. If public pressure governed legislative tempo, these are the cases in which it should have bitten hardest, and it did not bite at all.

The pattern is coherent under a veto-point account, and the legal materials specify where the veto sits. Along the branch-shifting portion of the sequence the executive performed identically in the two paired cases, within a day of each other and well inside the only statutory deadline in the process. The variance lies entirely in the segment controlled by parliamentary leadership, which ranged from six days to 1,102, and in the prior gateway of initiative endorsement, which some bills never pass at all. Negative agenda control is the operative constraint,^{6,8} and the record contains its exercise in documentary

form: the August 2021 decision to withhold transmission of the committee letter to the steering body, the September 2024 statement that the outgoing parliament would not act on the domestic-workers bill, the May 2025 refusal to accept the President's three-month timetable, and the continuing absence of any meeting on asset forfeiture three years after its presidential letter. The punctuated pattern predicted for agenda-constrained systems is present in its purest form: years of stasis, then enactment in days.^{8,9}

The jurisprudential asymmetry

Indonesian constitutional jurisprudence has developed a substantial doctrine on the making of statutes and none at all on their non-making. Decision No. 27/PUU-VII/2009 established that the process is justiciable through formal review. Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 gave that jurisdiction real content, holding the Job Creation Law conditionally unconstitutional for defects of form and requiring meaningful participation — the right to be heard, to have views considered, and to receive an explanation — a direction the legislature then codified in Law No. 13 of 2022.^{12,13} Yet the challenges to the six-day enactment of the anti-corruption amendment (Decisions Nos. 70 and 79/PUU-XVII/2019) did not disturb the statute.

The reasoning of these decisions, and not merely their outcomes, bears directly on the present argument. The ratio of Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 is that the constitutional standing of the people as the source of the legislative mandate makes participation a condition of the validity of the process by which a statute is made, and the Court gave that principle operational content in three limbs: a right to be heard, a right to have views considered, and a right to receive an explanation of how they were treated. The third limb is the one this article's third reform proposal extends. A duty to explain what was done with a submission is, in principle, indistinguishable from a duty to explain why a bill was deferred; both are applications of the same requirement that the exercise of legislative power be accounted for to those it binds. The proposal is therefore not an innovation imported from comparative sources but an extension of a

doctrine the Court has already articulated, applied at a stage the Court could not itself reach.

The reasoning in the challenges to the anti-corruption amendment cuts the same way from the opposite direction. The Court declined to invalidate a statute deliberated and passed in six days, and the operative reason was the absence of any mandatory rule of procedure that the compressed timetable could be said to have breached — not a judicial assessment that six days afforded adequate deliberation. That is the same silence this article identifies, encountered from the other end: because the statute regulates neither a minimum nor a maximum period, neither haste nor delay supplies a ground of formal review. Observations in those decisions about the desirability of adequate deliberation, being unnecessary to the disposition, are obiter and carry no operative force.

The asymmetry is structural rather than attitudinal, and that distinction matters for the remedy. Formal review presupposes an enacted norm to review; a bill that is never deliberated produces none, so there is no object against which the jurisdiction can operate. The Court could not reach this conduct however assertive it chose to be, and the point is not that it has been insufficiently bold. It follows that the guarantee of meaningful participation, however robust, attaches only after the discretionary gateway has been passed. A right to be heard on a bill under deliberation is of no assistance to a constituency whose bill is never deliberated, and on the present evidence that is the position of the constituencies behind asset forfeiture, indigenous rights and gender equality. The remedy must therefore be legislative and procedural rather than judicial and constitutional — which is also, on the evidence that Indonesian reform succeeds where it alters routine procedure rather than declaratory principle,^{14,28} the reform most likely to survive.

The comparative dimension and transplantability

The comparison in Table 7 is not offered as an argument that Indonesia should imitate Germany. It is offered to establish two narrower points. First, the Indonesian position is not a necessary feature of legislatures: three consolidated democracies with

different constitutional traditions each provide a route by which consideration can be compelled, so the absence of such a route in Indonesia is a design choice rather than an inevitability. Second, the design choices differ in ways that bear directly on transplantability. The American discharge petition requires an absolute majority and therefore reproduces, rather than constrains, the coalition control that this study identifies as the operative constraint; a majority willing to sign a discharge petition is a majority that could have scheduled the bill. The British model presupposes a distinction between government and backbench business that Indonesia's joint executive-legislative deliberation does not reproduce. The German mechanism is the transplantable one: a minority right exercisable by one parliamentary group or five per cent of members maps almost exactly onto the *fraksi* structure of the Indonesian House, requires no constitutional amendment, and constrains only the timing of consideration while leaving the substantive outcome untouched.

The international dimension reinforces the point without carrying the argument. Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges states to adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to give effect to Covenant rights, and ILO Convention No. 189 requires an effective legislative framework for domestic workers. Neither instrument prescribes a parliamentary timetable, and no violation is asserted here. What they establish is that indefinite legislative inaction is not a purely domestic procedural matter: where the obligation is accepted and the implementing bill sits undeliberated for 1,102 days, the delay has an international-law dimension that the domestic procedural rules do not currently register.

De lege lata

As the law stands, four deficiencies are established on this evidence. First, the temporal obligation is asymmetric: Article 49(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 binds the President to 60 days and no provision binds the House at any stage, a distribution the measured intervals show to be exactly inverted relative to where

the delay occurs. Second, the scheduling discretion is unconditioned: neither Law No. 17 of 2014 nor Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020 states any criterion, deadline or duty to give reasons governing the decision to place a bill on the agenda, and neither provides any route by which members or citizens can compel it. Third, carry-over under Article 71A operates without a resumption duty, converting dormancy from a procedural cost into a costless default. Fourth, the participation guarantee in Articles 96 and 96A attaches only to bills under deliberation, so the strengthened right is unavailable precisely where the obstruction occurs.

It bears emphasis that none of this is unlawful. No provision is breached when the *Badan Musyawarah* declines to schedule a bill, and the critique advanced here is not that the House has acted illegally. It is that the legal system contains a consequential power to which no corresponding duty attaches, and that the distribution of the one temporal duty it does contain is the reverse of what the evidence would justify.

De lege ferenda

Before the proposals are set out, the objection they will meet should be answered. An Indonesian constitutional lawyer will say that the order of parliamentary business is the paradigm of an internal matter, protected by the separation of powers and by the House's autonomy over its own procedure, and that a statutory deadline on deliberation is for that reason constitutionally suspect. The objection does not survive contact with the existing law. Article 22A of the Constitution expressly contemplates that the procedure for making statutes shall be regulated by statute, and Law No. 12 of 2011 already regulates the House's internal legislative procedure in considerable detail — the stages of deliberation, the two levels of approval, the required documents, and since 2022 the treatment of public submissions. A tabling deadline is a regulation of the same kind and of no greater intrusiveness than provisions already in force and unchallenged. What would raise a genuine separation-of-powers question is a rule compelling the House to reach a particular substantive outcome; none of the proposals below does that. Each regulates only the

refusal to decide, leaving the decision itself entirely in the House's hands. It should also be noted that the second proposal is addressed to the House's own standing orders, an instrument the House adopts and amends itself, which places it beyond the objection altogether.

Three reforms follow, drafted to the instruments that contain the defect and detailed in Table 8. The first is a statutory tabling deadline: a new Article 65A in Law No. 12 of 2011 requiring first-level deliberation to commence within 90 sitting days of the presidential

letter where the bill has been endorsed as a parliamentary initiative, failing which the presiding officer must report the reasons in plenary and at three-monthly intervals thereafter. Ninety sitting days is proposed rather than a calendar period because it accommodates recess and the electoral cycle; the reporting duty rather than an automatic consequence is proposed because a deadline whose breach voids nothing is more likely to be adopted and, on the evidence of the 60-day executive limit, deadlines in this system are in fact observed.

Table 8. *De lege ferenda*: three drafted reform measures.

No	Measure	Instrument and drafted provision	Implementing actor	Feasibility
1	Statutory tabling deadline	New Art. 65A, UU No. 12 Tahun 2011: where a bill has been endorsed as a parliamentary initiative and the presidential letter received, first-level deliberation shall commence within 90 sitting days; failing which the presiding officer shall report the reasons in plenary and at three-monthly intervals thereafter	DPR with the Government; <i>Prolegnas</i> amendment slot	High — amends an existing procedural statute; no constitutional amendment required
2	Minority-triggered discharge mechanism	New Art. 20A, Peraturan DPR RI No. 1 Tahun 2020: on the written demand of one <i>fraksi</i> or ten per cent of members, the <i>Badan Musyawarah</i> shall schedule first-level deliberation at the next available sitting for any bill meeting the Art. 65A conditions	DPR internally, by amendment of its own standing orders	Procedurally high, politically low; a five-year sunset clause is proposed to reduce the adoption cost
3	Duty to publish scheduling reasons	Amendment to Peraturan DPR RI No. 2 Tahun 2020 requiring publication within seven days of <i>Badan Musyawarah</i> agenda decisions, including bills deferred and the reason; and extension of Art. 96A of UU No. 12 Tahun 2011 so that the duty to answer public submissions attaches to scheduling decisions	DPR Secretariat-General and <i>Badan Legislasi</i> ; consistent with UU No. 14 Tahun 2008 on public information	Very high — a transparency measure altering no voting or majority rule

Note: The three measures give effect to UUD 1945 Art. 1(3), Art. 28C(2) and Art. 28D(1) and operate wholly within the space Art. 22A remits to ordinary legislation. None removes the legislature's substantive freedom to reject a bill; they regulate only the refusal to decide.

The second is a minority-triggered discharge mechanism: a new Article 20A in Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020 requiring the *Badan Musyawarah*, on the written demand of one *fraksi* or ten per cent of members, to schedule first-level deliberation of a qualifying bill at the next available sitting. The threshold is calibrated between the German five per cent and the American majority, and is deliberately set below the level at which a governing coalition could veto its use. This is the measure that constrains the discretion directly and it is therefore the one the body adopting it has least incentive to accept; a five-year sunset clause is proposed to lower that cost. The third is a duty to publish scheduling reasons, requiring publication of steering-body agenda decisions including bills deferred and the reason, and

extending the Article 96A duty to answer public submissions so that it attaches to scheduling decisions. This is the most feasible of the three — it alters no voting rule — and it is also the precondition for observing the veto directly rather than inferring it from its consequences.

Four points of drafting detail complete the proposals. First, a sitting day should be defined in the amending instrument itself as a day on which a plenary or commission session is convened under the published sitting calendar, since Indonesian practice supplies no settled meaning and a deadline turning on an undefined unit would be unenforceable. Second, the ten-per-cent threshold in the second proposal is derived rather than chosen at large: it is set above the level at which a single small *fraksi* could impose

repeated demands and below the level at which the largest coalition grouping could veto its use, so that it is exercisable by an opposition acting alone. The precise figure should be recalculated against the composition of each incoming House, and the drafting should express the threshold as a proportion rather than an absolute number for that reason. Third, because scheduling discretion is distributed rather than concentrated, a deadline addressed only to the steering body would risk displacing the obstruction upstream to commission leadership or to the *Badan Legislasi*; the proposed Article 65A is therefore drafted to attach to the bill's procedural status rather than to any single organ, so that the obligation follows the bill wherever it is arrested. Fourth, the third proposal claims less than existing law already supplies. Law No. 14 of 2008 on public information establishes a presumption of openness for public bodies and their decisions;²⁸ the argument that steering-body agendas and deferral decisions fall within that presumption is not a reform argument at all but an application of law currently in force, and the proposed amendment is best understood as codifying an obligation that already exists.

The three measures also have a natural sequence. Transparency is the cheapest to adopt and requires no change to any voting rule; once adopted, the pattern of deferrals becomes publicly observable, and on this article's own analysis of how mobilisation raises the cost of visible inaction, that observability raises the political price of resisting the remaining two. Reform of scheduling discretion is therefore more likely to succeed if it begins with disclosure rather than with compulsion.

All three operate within the space Article 22A of the Constitution remits to ordinary legislation. None requires constitutional amendment, none alters the majority required to enact a statute, and none removes the legislature's substantive freedom to reject a bill after considering it. They regulate only the refusal to decide, which is the conduct this study measures.

Theoretical implications

Two implications follow for scholarship. For theories of digital contention, accounts of

responsiveness should specify the institutional gateway at which attention is converted or blocked rather than treating responsiveness as a property of the polity as a whole: the same legislature was highly responsive and wholly unresponsive within the same period, depending on which bill is examined. This reframes what digital pressure does without dismissing it. It does not legislate and it does not compel scheduling; it raises the political cost of visible inaction and shapes the moment at which those controlling the calendar find action advantageous — which is why both victim-protection statutes were ultimately passed on symbolically charged occasions, and why enactment, once scheduled, was extremely rapid in every case in the set. The speed of these endgames is itself evidence: years of delay were never attributable to the deliberative complexity of the texts.

Two claims made here must be held together, and their compatibility is not self-evident. The article asserts that mobilisation raises the cost of visible inaction and shapes the moment at which a window is used, and also that the direction of mobilisation does not predict legislative speed. These are not in tension, because they concern different quantities: the first is a claim about when a scheduling decision is taken, the second about how long a bill takes once the anchor of joint deliberation has been set. Pressure may determine that a window opens in April rather than November without altering the duration of what follows, and the Indonesian record shows precisely that pattern — two victim-protection statutes passed on symbolically charged dates after years of dormancy, each completed within weeks once scheduled.

A pre-legislative gap

For legal theory, the finding identifies a gap of a kind that neither the implementation literature nor roll-call analysis is equipped to detect. The familiar concern is the distance between a statute and its enforcement. What the Indonesian record exposes is a prior gap between a bill's formal legal life and its access to deliberation — a pre-legislative gap that leaves no vote, no decision and no reviewable norm behind it. Formally, every bill in the priority programme has equal status; substantively, bills

opposed by mobilised publics were enacted at a median of 111 days and those demanded by them at 1,036. That is equality of listing without equality of access to the calendar, and it is invisible to every standard measure of legislative constraint.

Limitations

Five limitations bound these claims, and they are stated without mitigation. First, the bill-level analysis rests on eleven cases and cannot sustain confident inference: the direction contrast is significant under two of four specifications and not under the other two, and no preferred specification is nominated. Second, this remains observational: no counterfactual is estimated, and the design cannot exclude that elite preference drives both scheduling and the executive's speed, in which case agenda control is the mechanism through which a prior political variable operates rather than an independent cause. Third, mobilisation direction is coded as a categorical variable from documented protest evidence and does not capture intensity; the anti-corruption commission and Job Creation protests were far larger than those over mining or the capital city, and an intensity measure would likely do additional work. Fourth, the pressure measure at event level is an event indicator rather than a series, because historical hashtag volumes, search interest and petition trajectories could not be verified; this attenuates rather than inflates the estimated association, and the lower digital density recorded for the domestic-workers case may partly reflect thinner media coverage of domestic work rather than weaker mobilisation. Fifth, both chronologies are built from reported events and inherit media selection bias, and several dates are month-precise, including the April 2023 presidential letter whose exact day is reported inconsistently.

Four further limitations arose in the course of revision and are stated here rather than absorbed into the text. The sampling frame for the bill-level layer is purposive rather than exhaustive, as §2.6 records, so the group medians characterise contested bills and not legislative tempo generally. The log-rank test at $n = 11$ is underpowered, so the non-significant main specification is uninformative rather than

disconfirming — a point that cuts against the article's own thesis being confirmed as much as against its being refuted. Mobilisation direction is coded partly from protest occurring after the scheduling decision, which precludes any causal reading of the direction contrast. And the comparative layer contains no Southeast Asian jurisdiction, which limits its persuasive force for a regional readership; extending the comparison to the Philippines and Thailand is the most obvious next step for the comparative argument.

A further limitation is specific to the doctrinal layer. The claim that scheduling discretion operates as a veto is inferred from its consequences — measured delay, documented refusals, and bills that never began — and not observed directly, because the steering body's deliberations are not published. That is why the third reform proposed above is a transparency measure: it would convert the central inference of this article into an observable fact. The decisive next step is not more cases of this kind but access to scheduling records.

5. Conclusion

This study combined two source-verified event chronologies (136 events, $\kappa = 0.952$), direct measurement of procedural intervals, and a survival analysis of eleven contested bills to ask where public mobilisation stops determining legislative outcomes in Indonesia. Responsiveness was strong in one paired case and absent in the other; executive performance was near-identical across cases at 24 and 25 days, within the 60-day limit of Article 49(1), while the parliamentary segment — bound by no limit at all — ranged from six days to 1,102. Bills opposed by mobilised publics were enacted at a median of 111 days and bills demanded by them at 1,036, a contrast that is large and directionally robust but inferentially fragile at this sample size. *De lege lata*, the binding constraint on responsive lawmaking is neither public attention nor executive will but an unregulated scheduling discretion. *De lege ferenda*, three reforms are proposed: a 90-sitting-day tabling deadline in Law No. 12 of 2011; a discharge mechanism triggerable by one *fraksi* or ten per cent of members in Regulation of the House No. 1 of 2020; and a duty to publish scheduling reasons. A bill demanded for seventeen

years with a presidential letter in hand and no meeting ever convened is the clearest statement of the limit these reforms would address. Future research should seek the scheduling records that would render the discretion directly observable.

Declarations

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Conflicts of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Author contributions

Conceptualisation, M.C.A. and S.S.; methodology, M.C.A.; formal analysis, M.C.A. and N.N.I.; investigation and data curation, N.N.I.; writing — original draft preparation, M.C.A.; writing — review and editing, S.S. and N.N.I.; supervision, S.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Data availability

All materials accompany this article: the two event chronologies (136 events with type, actor, date-precision flag, digital-pressure indicator and a source URL for every event), the bill-level survival dataset, the codebook, the blind re-coding key used to compute Cohen's κ , and the analysis scripts reproducing every figure and statistic reported.

Ethics

The study analyses publicly reported events and published documents and involved no human subjects. Victims are identified only as they were already identified in the public record, and pseudonyms used by the press are retained.

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